The post-issue operating performance of seasoned equity issuers in Hong Kong. by Yip, Wai-chung. & Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Economics.
z . . . 
// ‘ . \ , • \ 
/ 
The Post-issue Operating Performance of 
Seasoned Equiij^I^suers in Hong Kong 
YIP Wai-chung 
A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment 
of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Philosophy 
in 
Economics 
© The Chinese University of Hong Kong 
June 2004 
The Chinese University of Hong Kong holds the copyright of this thesis. Any 
person(s) intending to use a part or whole of the materials in the thesis in a proposed 
publication must seek copyright release from the Dean of the Graduate School. 
广 ,統 ,馆書圖 
( 1 ( 2 3 1 15 j l j 
X^^ IBRARY SYSTEI^^ 
ABSTRACT 
Abstract of thesis entitled: 
The Post-Issue Operating Performance of Seasoned Equity Issuers in Hong Kong 
Submitted by YIP Wai-chung 
for the Degree of Master of Philosophy in Economics 
at The Chinese University of Hong Kong in June 2004 
Seasoned Equity Issuers have been extensively analyzed in empirical studies. It 
was found that post-issue operating performance deterioration and long-run 
underperformance of issuers were common phenomena in large and sophisticated 
equity markets, and a number of theories have been constructed to explain those 
phenomena. However, operating performance of Hong Kong seasoned equity issuers 
has not yet been addressed in the existing literature. 
This thesis concentrates on the post-issue operating performance of 925 
Seasoned Equity Offering (SEO) issuers listed in Hong Kong Stock Exchange from 
1991 to 1999 and tries to identify the determinants of the post-issue profitability 
decline by observing the operating performance of issuers categorized by firm size, 
ii 
market transaction volume, dividend payout ratio, degree of ownership concentration 
and type of ownership. In addition, price reactions from the market about the issues 
are examined through decomposing the price effect into announcement effect and 
long-run effect. 
A significant decline in operating performance subsequent to SEO is found. 
Firm size, market transaction volume and dividend payout ratio are the determinants 
of the decline while degree of ownership concentration and family ownership are not. 
The decline is smaller for larger issuers, larger market transaction issuers and lower 
dividend payout ratio issuers. It suggests that the corporate governance is better for 
larger firms and larger market transaction firms. Firms paying more dividends are 
merely producing signals of investor protection rather than relieving decline in 
profitability. Concentrated ownership and family ownership are not beneficial to 
SEOs in post-issue profitability change. Positive announcement effect and long-run 
underperformance of SEOs are also found. These findings are generally supportive 
of the Free Cash Flow Theory, the Windows of Opportunity Theory, the Market 
Over-optimism Theory and the Earning Management Theory as explanations of 
post-issue decline in firm value. Also, market investors do not understand the signal 
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Seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) are equity issues offered after initial public 
offering (IPO) and are usually in the form of placings, rights issues, open offers, 
consideration issues, warrants exercised and share option schemes. The 
Pecking-order Theory states that firms without adequate debt capacity should issue 
equity because of lower cost of finance and Harjoto and Garen (2003) claim that IPO 
firms should conduct SEOs when there is unpredictable growth after IPO in order to 
get external funding with low cost of equity. 
After the study of SEOs by Asquith and Mullins (1986), companies conducting 
SEOs have been extensively analyzed in empirical studies. Researchers try to link 
SEOs to post-issue stock price performance and profitability of issuers. They find 
poor stock market performance and post-SEO declines in profitability of firms 
conducting SEOs in various countries, sectors and stock markets. A number of 
theories try to explain the underperformance of stock price and operating 
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performance decline. Four major theories among these are the Free Cash Flow 
Theory by Jensen (1986), the Windows of Opportunity Theory by Myers and Majluf 
(1984), the Market Over-optimism Theory by Loughran and Ritter (1995) and the 
Earning Management Theory by DeAngelo (1986)/ The Free Cash Flow Theory 
states that due to agency problems, managers issue SEOs to increase proceeds for 
private benefit and the proceeds are usually misused. In the Windows of Opportunity 
Theory, managers, who are better informed than outsiders, issue SEOs when the 
stocks are over-priced. The Market Over-optimism Theory suggests that investors are 
too optimistic about the prospect of issuers and overlook the decline in profitability. 
In the Earning Management Theory, managers issue SEOs after manipulation on 
earning announcement in order to reduce cost of equity and investors are fooled by 
the manipulated figures. 
This thesis concentrates on the equity market in Hong Kong and focuses on the 
post-issue profitability and stock price performance of SEO issuers. The operating 
performance, as measured by net profit margin and pre-tax return on assets, will first 
be analyzed. According to the four theories concerning the performance decline of 
SEOs, the issuing firms are likely to experience a significant decline in those 
accounting variables after their issues. 
1 A detailed review will be presented in Chapter II. 
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As it will be shown, SEO issuers experience a significant decline in profitability 
after they issue SEOs. The next research question is to find the determinants of the 
post-issue decline. Since the quality of corporate governance is positively related to 
the operating performance and its change after SEOs, the effect of corporate 
governance variables such as firm size, market transaction volume, dividend payout 
ratio, degree of ownership concentration and family ownership on the profitability 
decline of SEO issuers will be studied. It is worth noticing that the corporate 
governance in Hong Kong as well as in the East Asia differs from that in the United 
States. 
Since the post-SEO deterioration in profitability and three determinants of the 
decline are found, three questions are addressed. First, does the market anticipate the 
decline in profitability? Second, does the market perceive a signal of sales of 
over-valued stocks in SEO announcements? Third, is the market able to anticipate 
the difference in profitability decline due to the three determinants? Therefore, price 
reactions from the market about the issues will be examined through decomposing 
the price effect into announcement effect and long-run effect. 
This thesis contributes to the literature in several ways. First, operating 
performance of Hong Kong seasoned equity issuers has not been addressed in the 
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existing literature. Second, it examines the size effect of Loughran and Ritter (1997) 
in determining operating performance decline. Third, it analyzes the effect of 
corporate governance variables, which are influential in Asian economies, on firms' 
profitability changes after SEOs. Lastly, it examines investors' rationality towards 
profitability changes. 
The post-issue operating performance of 925 SEO issuers listed in Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange from 1991 to 1999 inclusive is examined. This period is chosen 
because of better financial market development and better disclosure of company 
information in the 1990s. Consistent with previous studies, issuers experience a 
significant decline in net profit margin and pre-tax return on assets after their issues. 
The median change in net profit margin of sample issuers is -6.602 percent from one 
year prior to the offering to four years later? The median change in pre-tax return on 
assets is -4.498 percent. Among the years around the issue, the medians of the two 
ratios are the highest before the offerings and both decline after the offerings. The 
result is consistent with the four theories stated. 
While profitability deteriorations are observed for all groups categorized by 
firm size, market transaction volume, dividend payout ratio, degree of ownership 
2 The changes in levels of net profit margin and pre-tax profit over assets are computed instead of 
percentage changes. See Section 3.2.1 for more details. 
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concentration and type of ownership, it is found that the post-SEO profitability 
deterioration is more severe for smaller issuers, lower market transaction issuers and 
higher dividend payout issuers. Degree of ownership concentration and family 
ownership are not determinants of the post-issue deterioration in the sample. It 
suggests that the corporate governance is better for larger firms and larger market 
transaction firms, while firms paying more dividends are merely producing signals of 
investor protection instead of relieving decline in profitability. Concentrated 
ownership and family ownership are not beneficial to SEOs upon post-issue 
profitability changes. 
It is an established fact that profitability of SEOs decreases after their issues. 
Therefore, corporations that announce SEOs signal the sale of over-valued stocks, 
although information asymmetry exists. If the market is efficient, there should be 
price drops around the announcement of SEOs and long-run performance should be 
neutral. However, no negative announcement period return, as opposed to a negative 
long-run return, is found for 1165 announcements of SEOs from 1991 to 1999. The 
mean return of sample SEOs from one day prior to the announcement date to six 
days later is 3.327 percent. The mean three-year return is -32.912 percent. 
After dividing issuers into groups of different firm sizes, market transaction 
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volumes and dividend payout ratios, the positive announcement period returns and 
negative long-run returns are observed in all groups. Moreover, investors do not 
anticipate the difference in profitability declines between groups of different firm 
sizes, market transaction volumes and dividend payout ratios. They fail to understand 
the intention of managers and revalue the stocks in the announcement period. The 
results are consistent with the Windows of Opportunity Theory and suggest that the 
market is over-optimistic about the future earning power of SEOs. 
The thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter II gives a review of the literature and 
empirical results. Chapter III describes the sample data and methodology. Chapter IV 
presents the results on the operating performance of issuers following seasoned 





Empirical results are meaningless without theories. Therefore, it is necessary to 
understand the underlying theories. This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.1 
and 2.2 give literature reviews of the operating performance deterioration of SEOs, 
and the relation between corporate governance variables and the operating 
performance deterioration respectively. Section 2.3 and 2.4 discuss prior work on the 
price performance of SEO issuers, and the relation between determinants of 
operating performance decline and price performance. 
2.1 Operating Performance of SEO Issuers 
In this section, theoretical background and empirical studies about operating 
performance of SEO issuers are summarized. 
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2.1.1 Theoretical Background 
There are four leading explanations of why SEO issues are followed by decline 
in post-issue operating performance: the Free Cash Flow Theory, the Windows of 
Opportunity Theory, the Market Over-optimism Theory and the Earning 
Management Theory. The following subsections give a more detailed review of the 
four theories. 
2.1.1.1 Free Cash Flow Theory 
As managers do not own all the profits gained, they may extract private benefit 
from the companies to maximize their utility rather than devote every effort to 
company operation. Based on the agency problems, Jensen's (1986) Free Cash Flow 
Theory suggests that managers prefer to retain excess cash flow inside the firms 
instead of distributing it to shareholders. The retained earning may lead to investment 
on negative present value (NPV) projects. Once there is subsequent equity issue, the 
available resource for the manager increases. Since the number of positive present 
value project is limited, Jensen (1986) predicts that the manager may engage in NPV 
projects or misuse the cash flow. It suggests that there will be a decline in operating 
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performance after issuance and the decline depends on the investment opportunities. 
Jain and Kini (1994) report relatively superior post-IPO profitability of firms 
with high managerial ownership retention and the finding is consistent with the view 
that higher ownership retention incurs fewer agency problems. McLaughlin, 
Safieddine and Vasudevan (1996) define "Free Cash Flow” as operating income 
before depreciation (OIBD) net of total taxes, interest expense and total dividend and 
find that "Free Cash Flow" relative to assets is negatively related to the decline in 
profitability. They conclude that agency problem suggested by the Free Cash Flow 
Theory is one of the reasons of post-issue profitability deterioration. However, they 
do not find any significant relation between the decline and investment opportunities. 
On the other hand, Friday, Howton and Howton (2000) provide indirect 
evidence of the Free Cash Flow Theory and report non-negative post-issue operating 
performance changes in U.S. equity Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). They 
argue that the decline ceases because REITs are required to pay out 95 percent of 
their taxable income to existing shareholders through dividends. Therefore the cash 
flow in managers' hands is reduced and the agency problem is eased. The difference 
between the result from Friday, Howton and Howton (2000) and prior studies about 
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industrial SEOs^ suggests that the Free Cash Flow Theory, to a certain extent, is an 
explanation for the decline in operating performance. 
2.1.1.2 Windows of Opportunity Theory 
The second explanation for the operating performance decline is that managers 
issue equity when their stocks are overvalued. This phenomenon is called the 
Windows of Opportunity and is a widely accepted explanation for the decline of firm 
value of both IPOs and SEOs. Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that since managers 
have insider information, they can issue equity when the firm value is at a peak, but 
managers are reluctant to issue equity if their shares are underpriced. As a result, 
managers time equity issues to coincide future operating performance decline that is 
unanticipated by the market. The operating performance as well as the firm value are 
at their peaks around the time of issue and will decline after the equity issue. 
Managers can take advantage of the Windows of Opportunity by reducing cost of 
equity. 
Owing to the information asymmetry between insider management and outsider 
3 See Section 2.1.2 for studies about the U.S. industrial SEOs. 
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investors, the signaling literature regards SEOs as negative signals of firm value. All 
equity issues signal that stocks are over-valued. Therefore, the opportunistic 
behaviors of managers are successful only if the market fails to interpret the negative 
signal and does not provide unbiased revaluation of the stocks after the 
announcements of SEOs. 
A number of empirical studies explain the post-SEO decline in firm value with 
the existence of the Windows of Opportunity, but most of them only provide indirect 
evidence of the opportunistic behavior of management. Korajczyk，Lucas and 
McDonald (1991) suggest that firms are more likely to issue equity after favorable 
earning announcements while McLaughlin, Safieddine and Vasudevan (1996) find 
that overvalued firms tend to issue SEOs. 
To directly show that managers anticipate post-SEO decline in firm value, 
Kaipoff and Lee (1991) report significant insider selling before SEO announcements. 
Gombola, Lee and Liu (1997) document abnormal net selling by managers in the 
first month after SEOs are announced. Those findings suggest that managers have 
private information about the companies and therefore issue equity when there is 
overvaluation. 
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The Free Cash Flow Theory and the Windows of Opportunity Theory are not 
only explanations for the post-SEO profitability deterioration but also the 
motivations for SEOs. The Free Cash Flow Theory suggest that managers issue 
SEOs to increase cash flow for private benefits while in the Windows of Opportunity 
Theory, managers issue SEOs to reduce costs of equity. The following theories, 
namely the Market Over-optimism Theory and Earning Management Theory, are 
merely explanations for the post-issue decline in profitability but not the reasons for 
SEOs. 
2.1.1.3 Market Over-optimism Theory 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) give explanations to the post-issue 
underperformance of SEOs in a different viewpoint and argue that investors have 
made errors in their forecast of future earning. Based on existing earning reports, 
investors as well as analysts occasionally overestimate the future profitability of the 
SEO firm and suffer losses in their investment when the performance deteriorates 
after the SEOs. 
Researchers basically examine the Market Over-optimism Theory in two ways. 
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One is to examine analysts' forecasts of SEO firms and the other is to examine price 
responses on post-issue earning announcements. The empirical results of the 
analysts' forecasts are mixed. Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (1998) find that analysts 
are abnormally optimistic on subsequent earning power of SEO issuers whilst Teoh 
and Wong (2002) report anomalous long-run growth forecasts of SEO firms. Hansen 
and Sarin (1998), however, do not find over-optimism of analysts on SEOs. 
If the Market Over-optimism Hypothesis holds, the expectation will be 
corrected over time by investors through price adjustment. For the analysis of 
investors' reaction on post-issue earning announcements, the result is also mixed. 
Rangan (1998) and Jegadeesh (2000) find that there are significant negative returns 
on SEO firms after their post-issue earning announcements. The results reveal that 
investors are surprised at earning announcements. Meanwhile, Boms, Datar and Kini 
(2001) examine the price reaction on post-issue earning announcements over five 
years and observe that investors are not surprised at poor earnings realizations. 
2.1.1.4 Earning Management Theory 
The concept of earning management is first introduced by DeAngelo (1986) 
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who finds that managers manipulate earnings around management buyouts. 
Therefore, researchers suspect managers can manipulate earnings around SEOs. 
Management is motivated to revise earnings upward to increase the proceeds from 
SEOs and reduce costs of equity. Accrual is regarded as the major tool for earning 
management because accrual exists when the timing of revenue or expense does not 
align with the time of their realization, and can be manipulated through switching 
depreciation methods, realizations of gains and deferrals of taxes. The earning 
management is successful only if investors are always misled by the earning 
announcements and wrongly anticipate the future earning power of the SEO issuers. 
As mentioned, accrual usually exists; therefore researchers (for example, Teoh, 
Welch and Wong, 1998; Rangan, 1998) classify accrual into discretionary accrual 
representing opportunistic earning management and non-discretionary accrual 
representing non-opportunistic behavior. The Earning Management Theory predicts 
that the discretionary accrual increases around issuing years. 
The empirical results agree with the Earning Management Theory. Teoh, Welch 
and Wong (1998) find that abnormal discretionary accruals are negatively related to 
the post-issue stock returns for all firms but the relation is more significant for SEO 
issuers than non-issuers. Rangan (1998) obtains similar conclusion and reports the 
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positive relation between discretionary accruals and the post-issue profitability 
deterioration. Shivakumar (2000) agrees to the existence of earning management but 
argues that since the market treats all firms engaging in earning management due to 
failure of signaling, the managers respond to the anticipated reaction from the market 
through non-opportunistic earning management. 
In summary, all the four theories predict declines in operating performance 
during post-issue period but the means and the motivations are different. In the Free 
Cash Flow Theory, managers issue SEOs to increase proceeds for private benefit; in 
the Windows of Opportunity Theory, managers expect declines in operating 
performance (which can be natural declines) and issue SEOs to reduce costs of 
equity and protect their and existing shareholders' interests; in the Market 
Over-optimism Theory, managers issue SEOs without opportunistic motivation but 
investors are too optimistic about the prospect of issuers (which can be natural 
declines too); in the Earning Management Theory, managers issue SEOs after 
manipulation on earning announcements in order to reduce costs of equity and 
investors are fooled by the manipulated figures. The first two theories mentioned are 
also motivations for SEOs while the other two are only explanations for the 
post-issue profitability deterioration. 
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The abovementioned four theories are effective only when there is information 
asymmetry. In the Free Cash Flow Theory, the actions of managers are not 
observable for existing shareholders; hence managers can extract private benefits 
using resources in corporations; in the Windows of Opportunity Theory, the Market 
Over-optimism Theory and the Earning Management Theory, only insiders can 
correctly anticipate the post-issue profitability deterioration of the issuers and 
outsiders cannot observe opportunistic behaviors of management. 
2.1.2 Empirical Background 
The empirical test on the post-issue deterioration in operating performance is 
first conducted by Healy and Palepu (1990), who examine 93 SEOs listed on the 
American and New York Stock Exchanges from 1966 to 1981 and find no significant 
post-issue earning decline. Hansen and Crutchley (1990) analyze another sample 
consisting of 109 SEOs from 1975 to 1982 and find a significant post-issue decline 
in profitability. 
After their studies, several studies try to increase the sample size and test on 
other stock markets. For example, McLaughlin, Safieddine and Vasudevan (1996), 
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Loughran and Ritter (1997) use larger samples including NASDAQ companies and 
obtain similar results. McLaughlin, Safieddine and Vasudevan (1996) report a 
decrease in operating performance after SEOs in 1296 U.S. industrial issuers from 
1980 to 1991. The declines are statistically significant in both unadjusted and 
industry-adjusted measurements. The median in cash flow ratio declines by one-fifth 
in three years subsequent to SEOs. Meanwhile, Loughran and Ritter (1997) examine 
1338 U.S. industrial SEOs from 1979 to 1989，and find that the median profit margin 
and median return on assets decrease by more than a half in four years after SEOs. 
Afterwards, researchers expand the analysis to other countries and sectors. Cai 
and Loughran (1998) report a post-issue operating performance decline of 1389 
Japanese industrial SEOs but they conclude that the decline is smaller than that of the 
U.S. industrial issuers found by Loughran and Ritter (1997) because of the better 
establishment of Japanese firms. Friday, Howton and Howton (2000) examine the 
post-issue operating performance of 200 equity Real Estate Investment Trusts that 
issue SEOs and find that the change in operating performance is non-negative. 
Surprisingly, Alderson and Betker (2000) find that without the proceeds from 
SEOs (and hence fewer agency problems as cash in hand is reduced), firms that 
withdraw SEOs also experience a post-issue profitability decline. The result suggests 
17 
that there should be causes of decline other than the Free Cash Flow Theory. 
2.2 Corporate Governance Variables and Operating 
Performance 
As shown in the last section, both the theories and empirical results suggest that 
SEO issuers experience declines in profitability after SEOs and one of the possible 
reasons for the deterioration is agency problems of managers. According to the 
Corporate Governance theories, effective corporate governance can relieve agency 
problems. Hence the operating performance is improved and the deterioration is 
reduced. Therefore, the relation between several corporate governance variables and 
operating performance are examined. 
Corporate governance arises as separation of ownership and control induces 
agency problems. Since managers do not own all the profits gained, they may extract 
private benefit from the companies rather than devote every effort to company 
operation. They may shirk, steal from the company and implement policies that are 
beneficial to them alone. Those costs that arise from opportunistic behaviors are 
called agency costs. 
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Jensen and Meckling (1976) claim zero agency cost firms are those firms that 
are wholly owned by a manager. If ownership is less than 100 percent, agency costs 
exist and operating performance of companies deteriorates. Corporate Governance 
theorists suggest some remedies to cope with the agency problems. The remedies are 
based on measures that increase costs of opportunistic behaviors, reduce available 
resources for private benefits and align interests between shareholders and managers. 
Effective monitoring, reduction of cash flow and incentive schemes are examples 
that serve these three goals. 
Many variables affect the quality of remedies. Therefore, five major factors, 
namely firm size, market transaction volume, dividend payout ratio, degree of 
ownership concentration and family ownership, will be examined in order to identify 
the determinants of the decline. Besides Corporate Governance theories, other 
existing theories that document relation between these factors, the operating 
performance and its changes will also be addressed. In the remaining parts of this 
section, a literature review of the relation between the five corporate governance 
variables and operating performance will be given. 
19 
2.2.1 Firm Size and Operating Performance 
Large firms comprise huge investment and assets. Therefore, there are only two 
possibilities: investors hold substantial shares or value of the firm, or there are large 
numbers of investors. In the first case, investors have adequate incentives to collect 
information about the companies, monitor the operation of companies and put 
pressure on the management. In the second case, a large number of investors 
increases market attention to the companies and the asymmetric information problem 
is less acute because more analyses about them are published. In both cases, large 
corporations are more likely to be properly governed and monitored, and hence large 
companies are more profitable than small companies. Also, as the market focuses on 
large corporations, the cost of opportunistic behavior in larger firms is higher. 
On the other hand, Rajan and Zingales (1998) suggest that increases in investor 
protection improve the financial market and firms can get financing more easily and 
hence the firm size increases. Similarly, better investor protection is associated with 
larger firm size as protection reduces cost of external equity. Therefore, large firms 
usually implement better investor protection and incur less agency costs. Moreover, 
large firms face less external finance constraint because of its size and value of 
tangible assets. Therefore, large issuers should be more profitable than small issuers 
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and the larger the firm size, the smaller the post-issue profitability decline will be. 
The empirical results support the positive size effect on operating performance. 
McLaughlin, Safieddine and Vasudevan (1996) find negative relation between firm 
size and post-issue operating performance decline. Meanwhile, Loughran and Ritter 
(1997) find that the post-issue profitability of small issuers is the worst and the 
decline is the largest among all the issuers. However, they do not provide statistical 
test to examine the relation between firm size and profitability decline. 
2.2.2 Market Transaction Volume and Operating Performance 
Besides firm size, market transaction volume also affects corporate governance. 
Theorists suggest that firms with large market transaction volume draw more 
attention from market investors, so investors are more willing to devote resources 
and efforts to monitor the firms which work to reduce opportunistic behavior of 
management. Hence, the corporate governance of large-market-transaction firms is 
better than that of small-market-transaction firms. 
In the context of information asymmetry, Kabir (1997) finds positive relation 
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between frequency of disclosure of company information and trading volume 
because investors are more willing to invest in companies with less asymmetric 
information. It implies that firms with larger market transaction possess less private 
information and implement a better disclosure system. Owing to the more resources 
devoted and less information asymmetry, market transaction volume should be 
positively related to profitability and negatively related to the extent of the 
profitability decline. 
2.2.3 Dividend Payout Ratio and Operating Performance 
While firm size and market transaction volume are predicted to be positively 
related to operating performance, the relation between dividend payout ratio and 
operating performance is inconclusive. 
Jensen's (1986) Free Cash Flow Theory implies that dividend is a useful remedy 
to the agency problems because the firms' retained earnings are reduced by dividend 
payouts to shareholders. As a result, the firms can reduce non-productive spending. 
Unfortunately, payout ratio is determined partially by managers. Therefore, 
researchers work on the reasons why dividend is paid out. 
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According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), there is no agency problem in the 
world, and therefore there is no reason for dividends. In the world with agency costs, 
there are two major views on the reasons for dividends: Dividends are "outcomes of 
investor protection" and “substitutes for investor protection" suggested by La Porta 
et al. (2000). In the first view, dividends are fruitful consequences of investor 
protection. According to La Porta et al. (2000)，under a comprehensive and 
effectively enforceable investor protection system, shareholders can force companies 
to pay out dividend through the sale of their portion to raiders, votes of directors and 
making legal claims against the companies for expropriation. Therefore, La Porta et 
al. (2000) suggest the better the investor protection, the higher the dividend payout 
ratio is. 
If the Outcome model holds, firms with higher dividend payout ratio better 
protect investors. The high dividend payout ratio dampens possible expropriation by 
managers that improves the profitability of the firms because of better management. 
Therefore, the group with higher dividend payout ratio will experience a smaller 
decline in operating performance. 
According to the second view, dividends may be paid as substitutes and signals 
of investor protection. La Porta et al. (2000) claim that this view heavily relies on the 
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need of external fund from the capital market. The firms pay out dividends to signal 
that they protect interests of minority shareholders in order to attract investment in 
the firms. This reputation effect is more important for the firms in countries with 
poor investor protection than those in countries with adequate investor protection. 
The relation between dividend payout ratio and investor protection is negative. Based 
on the two models, the theoretical predictions are inconclusive. 
2.2.4 Other Corporate Governance Variables and Operating 
Performance 
Besides the three corporate governance variables mentioned, two more major 
variables, namely ownership concentration and family ownership, will be introduced. 
The effects of ownership concentration on agency costs are well documented in 
the existing literature. The fundamental view is that concentrated ownership 
enhances effective monitoring and reduces agency problem. Berle and Means (1932) 
first suggest that ownership concentration should be negatively related to agency 
costs. Wruck (1989) finds a positive announcement effect of private sale of stocks 
and attributes the price rises to the increase in ownership concentration. Large 
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shareholders are motivated to collect information, exercise close monitoring because 
of substantial investment in the company. They also have sufficient voting power to 
nominate directors and sack management for opportunistic behavior and control over 
the use of resources in the company. Therefore, concentrated ownership can align the 
interests of managers and shareholders, and hence increases firm value and improves 
operating performance. 
The benefit of concentrated ownership is commonly agreed but according to 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), there should be some costs of concentrated ownership. 
When the rights of minority investors to share the firm's profits are not adequately 
protected, concentrated ownership incurs a cost. Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes 
and Shleifer (2000) suggest that large shareholders can extract private benefits via 
expropriation of tangible assets, cash and profit from the corporation, implementing 
favorable transfer pricing, excessive compensation for the executives, advantageous 
use of investment opportunities, appointing unqualified family members to be 
managerial staff and “loan guarantees using the firm's assets as collateral". Although 
some of them are illegal, their occurrence depends on the enforcement of law. 
Expropriation exacerbates when the cash flow rights of controlling shareholders 
do not coincide with their voting rights. The dispersion usually occurs in pyramid 
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ownership. When the control is in pyramid structure, an entrepreneur can control 
other companies through the holdings of the controlling corporation without holding 
substantial cash flow rights. For example, an entrepreneur owns 60 percent of 
company A, which in turn control 60 percent of its subsidiary, company B. The cash 
flow rights of the entrepreneur on company B are 36 percent but the control rights 
are 60 percent. The difference between cash flow rights and control rights enlarges 
when company B owns other subsidiaries. The dispersion reduces the incentive for 
large shareholders to monitor and increases the incentive to expropriate from firms. It 
suggests that the operating performance will deteriorate due to concentrated 
ownership as agency costs increase. The two views give contradicting prediction on 
the operating performance and its changes of SEOs. 
Family ownership means that the largest shareholder is a family and some 
family members are shareholders of the corporation. The effects of family ownership 
are similar to that of concentrated ownership in the way that there are benefits and 
costs of family ownership. 
In Corporate Governance theories, family owners can serve the same roles as 
blockholders and effectively monitor the managers. Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) report 
a three-percentage point lower agency cost in family-owned small corporations in the 
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United States than those which are non-family-owned. Family ownership is also 
beneficial when the family shareholders supply a manager because of insider 
management. 
Information asymmetry makes monitoring difficult and agency costs arise. 
Therefore, insider management reduces information costs and aligns interest between 
shareholders and management. Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) examine 1708 small 
corporations and report that agency costs are significantly larger when an outsider 
manages a firm than when an insider manages a firm. As a result, if managers are 
supplied by blockholders, the agency costs are the least because the incentive to 
monitor is the largest. In fact, family ownership and management is prevalent in 
Hong Kong and the East Asia. 
However, Johnson, Boone, Breach and Friedman (2000) argue that weak legal 
protection of non-controlling shareholders, which are common in the East Asia, 
makes expropriation easily occur and poor corporate governance is the main cause of 
the Asian financial crisis. Moreover, pyramid and crossholding ownership are 
common in Hong Kong and the East Asia, which exacerbates the problem of 
expropriation. 
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In conclusion, concentrated ownership and family ownership can improve 
operating performance of companies because of effective monitoring of managers. 
However, if poor legal protection of minority shareholder, pyramid and cross-holding 
structures are prevalent, the costs of those forms of ownership are possible 
expropriation of controlling shareholders from the companies. Therefore, the 
predictions are mixed. 
2.3 Price Performance of SEO Issuers 
In the last two sections, literature reviews of profitability and possible 
determinants of the deterioration are given. Price performance of SEO issuers, which 
reflects investors' reaction on the changes in profitability, will be reviewed. The 
price performance is divided into announcement and long-run effects. 
2.3.1 Announcement Effect 
If investors are rational and the price properly reflects the future cash flow of a 
company, the post-issue operating performance deterioration should associate with 
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negative abnormal stock returns of SEOs instantaneously. In fact, a lot of literature 
studies the stock price movement of SEOs rather than their post-issue operating 
performance. 
Researchers suggest that important corporate announcements are signals of the 
quality of the firms because there is information asymmetry between insiders and 
outsiders. For example, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990) report positive anomalous 
stock movement after the announcements of stock repurchases. They are positive 
signals because the announcements reveal that managers remain positive about the 
prospects of the companies. Other announcements such as merger and acquisition, 
split off and withdrawals of SEO also possess signaling power. 
If the Windows of Opportunity Hypothesis is valid, announcement of an SEO is 
a signal that the stocks are overpriced. Alderson and Betker (2000) find negative 
announcement effect in SEOs that are withdrawn subsequently. They suggest that 
withdrawn SEOs are free from Free Cash Flow problem and they attribute the 
negative announcement effect to the overvaluation. Therefore, if the market 
perceives the signal of overvaluation and responds efficiently, there should be 
negative announcement effects. 
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The direct evidence of announcement effects is analyzed in many studies. Smith 
(1986) summarizes several previous studies and concludes that the negative 
announcement effect of SEOs is on average 3 percent. In contrast, Loderer, Sheehan 
and Kadlec (1991) and Tripathy and Rao (1992) report positive abnormal returns for 
the first 20 to 30 trading days after the issue date. Brous and Kini (1994) find that 
there are abnormal positive returns if the SEO issue increases institutional ownership, 
which improves corporate governance of the issuers. However, most of the SEO 
cannot increase institutional ownership, so most researchers find negative 
announcement effects. McLaughlin, Safieddine and Vasudevan (2000) report that the 
announcement period return is -2.9 percent. Furthermore, they investigate whether 
the reputation of underwriter magnifies the announcement effect and find that SEOs 
underwritten by "lower prestige investment bankers" experience more negative 
announcement period slumps. 
2.3.2 Long-run Effect 
Researchers also document the negative price reaction in the long run. Loughran 
and Ritter (1995) report that on average, the U.S. SEO issuers underperform 
30 
comparable non-issuers by 7 percent on a five-year basis. Meanwhile, Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves (1995) find that the mean value of the stock of SEOs is only 85.4 
percent of that of comparable non-issuers after three years from the issue. 
Apart from the U.S. market, Stehle, Ehrhardt and Przyborowsky (2000) find less 
underperformance in German seasoned equity issues. Cai and Loughran (1998) 
examine SEO firms in a drastically different economy, Japan, and find that three-year 
return is 34 percent compared to 52 percent of comparable benchmark. It seems that 
long-run underperformance of SEO issuers is a worldwide phenomenon. 
Most researchers think that the Free Cash Flow Theory, the Windows of 
Opportunity Theory, the Market Over-Optimism Theory and the Earning 
Management Theory are primary causes of long-run stock underperformance. 
However, if the slump in earnings is anticipated, there should be only negative 
announcement effects but not long-run effects. Therefore, two more explanations for 
the long-run post-issue underperformance emerge: information asymmetry and 
market inefficiency. If information is symmetric, the market will fully recognize the 
overvaluation (the future decline of firm values suggested by the four theories) as 
insiders do after the announcement. Hence a negative announcement effect follows 
and there will not be abnormal long-run stock returns. However, if an abnormal 
31 
long-run underperformance is present, it suggests that the market may not completely 
understand the intention to issue SEO or the degree of overvaluation. 
Apart from the information asymmetry, the market may not be efficient. The 
Semi-strong Form Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) asserts that all publicly 
available information is fully reflected in securities prices and fundamental analysis 
is useless. The overvaluation of SEOs is extensively documented in literature, article, 
and news reports. Therefore, rational investors should respond shortly after the 
announcement. However, if abnormal long-run underperformance exists, it suggests 
that the market may not efficiently respond to the intention to issue SEO or the 
degree of overvaluation. 
2.4 Determinants of Operating Performance Decline and 
Price Performance 
As it will be shown, three determinants of the operating performance decline, 
namely firm size, market transaction volume and dividend payout ratio are found. 
Here, literature reviews of the relation between the three determinants and price 
performance are given. 
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Firm size effects on stock returns of SEOs are documented in several articles 
and the results are inconclusive. Cai and Loughran (1998) investigate 1389 SEOs in 
Japan from 1971 to 1992 and conclude that firm size does not significantly affect the 
long-run underperformance of SEO issuers. McLaughlin, Safieddine and Vasudevan 
(2000) examine 649 SEO issuers in the U.S. from 1980 to 1994 and find no 
statistically significant difference in the announcement and long-run effect between 
the two size groups. Jegadeesh (2000) divides SEO issuers into five size quartiles 
and finds that smaller SEO firms experience larger underperformance. 
For market transaction volume and dividend payout ratio, there is no existing 




SAMPLE DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This chapter presents the sample and data description and explains the 
methodology employed in the tests of operating performance and price performance 
of SEOs. 
3.1 Sample Data Description 
The sample consists of all the SEOs of listed companies from 1991 to 1999 on 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and is collected from the Stock Exchange Fact Book, 
the Fact Sheet and the Hong Kong Economic Journal Monthly. 
The sample comprises 925 firm commitment SEOs satisfying the following 
criteria. First, only SEO methods that are placings, rights issues or open offers are 
included due to insufficient data of other forms of SEOs such as consideration issues, 
warrants exercised and share option schemes. Second, no matter how many times a 
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listed company issues SEOs in a year, only one issue in the year is included.^ To be 
specific, re-issues are omitted in each year to avoid biases introduced by multiple 
issuers. Third, only SEOs with allotment date (for placings) or payment date (for 
rights issues) during the period 1991-1999 are considered. 
In Loughran and Ritter，s (1997) methodology, they exclude firms that issue 
another SEO within five years after the issue date of an SEO. Once a company issues 
an SEO, the company cannot enter the sample within five years after the issue date. 
They claim that this measure alleviates dependence problem in statistical testing. 
However, with a similar methodology to exclude SEOs on a three-year basis, the 
sample size would be reduced to only 351 observations. Therefore, SEOs are not 
excluded through a similar method. McLaughlin, Safieddine and Vasudevan (1996) 
do not exclude SEOs to reduce dependence but obtain similar results as Loughran 
and Ritter (1997) do. Therefore, it is reasonable to suspect that dependence does not 
materially affect the results.^ 
It is common to exclude utility firms and financial institutions because of the 
regulatory process of regulated utilities and the possible distortion of some 
accounting ratios due to the idiosyncratically high leverage of financial institutions 
4 This restriction will be relaxed in Chapter V, which is about price performance of SEOs. 
5 In unpresented work, similar results are obtained from reduced sample on a three-year basis. 
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(for example, McLaughlin, Safieddine and Vasudevan, 1996; Loughran and Ritter, 
1997). Those corporations are not excluded here for two reasons: 1) the proportion of 
utility firms in the SEO sample is extremely small, namely 0.76 percent (See Table 
1); 2) possible distortion is reduced when ratios that do not involve financial leverage 
are employed. As it will be documented, net profit margin and pre-tax return on 
assets will be measured. 
As in McLaughlin, Safieddine and Vasudevan (1996) and Loughran and Ritter 
(1997), delisted firms and privatized firms in years subsequent to SEOs are not 
excluded in the present study. The annual data until the firms delist will be measured. 
Therefore, the sample is free from survivor bias.^ Like other studies (for example, 
McLaughlin, Safieddine and Vasudevan, 1996; Loughran and Ritter, 1997), there is 
no restriction on the number of annual figure available in the data sources. 
Panel A of Table 1 reports the distribution of SEOs from the period 1991 to 
1999. The largest and the second largest numbers of SEOs take place during 1997 
and 1999 respectively. The SEOs in 1993, 1997 and 1999 constitute around 50 
percent of the sample. Panel B reports the industrial classification in Industrial 
Classification Level 3 in the DataStream for the sample. As shown, property 
6 The bias, if any, should be small because delisted firms only constitute around 5 percent of the 
sample 
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companies and financial institutions share the highest proportion while resources, 
utilities and non-cyclical services providers constitute a very small proportion. The 
industry classification of the sample is adequately diversified so that possible 
dominance by individual industries does not arise. 
3.2 Methodology 
The analysis is organized as follows. First, the operating performance through 
two accounting variables, such as net profit margin and pre-tax return on assets will 
be analyzed. Second, the effect of corporate governance variables such as firm size, 
market transaction volume, dividend payout ratio，degree of ownership concentration 
and family ownership on the profitability decline of SEO issuers will be studied. 
Third, price reactions from the market about the issues will be examined through 
decomposing the price effect into announcement effect and long-run effect. Finally, 
the relation between determinants of the operating performance decline and the price 
performance will be investigated. The methodology of each part is stated in the 
following subsections. 
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3.2.1 Operating Performance of SEO Issuers 
The operating performance of SEO issuers around their issues is examined. Two 
variables, namely net profit margin and pre-tax return on assets are employed. 
Employing more than one accounting variable can increase robustness and reduce 
possible bias due to industrial distortion^ Net profit margin equals the published 
after-tax profit divided by the total sales or total property income depending on 
sectors at the end of year. The after-tax measure is appropriate because corporate tax 
rate does not change dramatically in Hong Kong and it causes little distortion. This 
measure is also employed in the study of Loughran and Ritter (1997). Since there is 
not adequate data available in a single source, 8 the data is obtained from the 
DataStream, the Pacific-Basin Capital Markets Databases (PACAP) and the Hong 
Kong Listed Companies Annual & Interim Reports. The definitions in these three 
sources are the same. 
The second measure is pre-tax return on assets. Pre-tax return on assets equals 
the pre-tax profit divided by the total assets at the end of year. Pre-tax return is the 
profit before tax published by the company and inclusive of associates' pre-tax profit 
7 McLaughlin, Safieddine and Vasudevan (1996) examine the operating performance through one 
variable, while Loughran and Ritter (1997) employ four different accounting variables. 
8 Among the 925 observations, only the net profit margins in the issuing year of 460 observations are 
available in the DataStream. 
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while total assets equals the sum of current and non-current assets that is the total of 
tangible and intangible fixed assets, other long-term assets and investments and 
current assets as reported in the balance sheet. Since profit depends on how a SEO 
firm makes use of the assets and the measure should be comparable across firms and 
times, pre-tax return is scaled by assets. This practice is commonly used in analysis 
(for example, Jain and Kini, 1994; Loughran and Ritter，1997). The data is primarily 
obtained from the DataStream. Nonetheless, due to severe missing data problem, 
supplementary data is obtained from the Hong Kong Listed Companies Annual & 
Interim Reports. Data definitions in these two sources are the same. 
Since earning data is skewed and sample means are easily influenced by 
unusually large or small observations, as in many other studies,^ the median values 
of the two variables are measured. The median annual values are measured from one 
year prior to the offering (it is denoted as Year -1) until three years after the offering. 
Also, the median changes of variables from Year -1 and Year 0 (the year of issuing) 
to t year(s) after the offering (it is denoted as Year t, where t = +1, +2，+3) are 
measured. In this thesis, the change of operating performance until three years after 
the issue is measured so as to allow the new assets purchase to become fully 
9 For example, Healy and Palepu (1990), Jain and Kini (1994), McLaughlin, Safieddine and 
Vasudevan (1996) and Loughran and Ritter (1997) 
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productive. 
It is worth noting that the changes in levels of net profit margin and pre-tax 
return on assets are computed instead of percentage changes of the two ratios 
because the change in levels is a more common measurement of the change in 
operating performance of a firm (for example, Smith, 1990; Degnorge and 
Zeckhauser, 1993; Jain and Kini, 1994; McLaughlin, Safieddine and Vasudevan, 
1996). Barber and Lyon (1996) illustrate an example and suggest that the change in 
levels is a better and more accurate measure than percentage change in indicating the 
operating performance of companies. 
The number of observations varies in different Year t and different accounting 
ratios because of the missing data for same observations in the combined data 
sources (the DataStream, the PACAP and the Hong Kong Listed Companies Annual 
& Interim Reports). As it will be shown, there are more missing data for pre-tax 
return on assets. 
The medians and median changes of operating performance are not persuasive 
unless they are tested with appropriate statistical methods. Therefore, in Chapter IV, 
all significance levels are based on the two-tailed Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test. It is a 
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one-sample test if individual median accounting ratio (or its median change) is tested 
against zero, while it is a two-sample test if differences in median accounting ratio 
(or its median change) between two groups are tested. 
The non-parametric test method is employed because it makes limited 
assumptions on the distribution of the operating performance variables. Barber and 
Lyon (1996) argue that due to extreme values of operating performance variables, the 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test is more powerful than the parametric t-test. Besides, 
ranking filters out extreme observations. The Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test assumes 
the observations are independent and the distribution is symmetric. 
In some studies, the changes in operating performance are adjusted for industry 
to avoid dominance of operating performance in a particular industry. In this thesis, 
no adjustment for industry is made because unlike those studies，i�the industry 
distribution of the sample is diverse and the SEOs are quite evenly located in 
different years. Therefore, a bloom or a slump of an industry cannot dominate the 
operating performance and its deterioration in the sample. ^ ^ 
10 In those studies, such as McLaughlin, Safieddine and Vasudevan (1996) and Loughran and Ritter 
(1997), financial institutions and utility firms are excluded while in this thesis, they are not. 
In unpresented work, non-issuers experience profitability improvement occasionally. If there is any 
decline in profitability, that of non-issuers are smaller than that of issuers. 
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3.2.2 Corporate Governance Variables and Operating 
Performance 
After the analysis of the post-issue changes in operating performance of SEOs, 
the effect of corporate governance variables such as firm size, market transaction 
volume, dividend payout ratio, degree of ownership concentration and family 
ownership on the changes in operating performance will be studied. To examine if 
corporate governance variables affect the operating performance and performance 
decline after SEO, for every variable, the sample is split into two groups by proxies 
of the variables. Then, the operating performance and profitability decline of the two 
groups are computed and the difference between the two groups is tested with the 
Wilcoxon Two-Sample Signed Rank Test. The null hypothesis is that the 
distributions of ratios (or their changes) from the two groups are identical. The 
proxies of operating performance (i.e. net profit margin and pre-tax return on assets) 
are the same as in the last subsection. The proxies of firm size, market transaction 
volume, dividend payout ratio，degree of ownership concentration and family 
ownership as well as their definitions will be stated in subsequent parts of this 
subsection. 
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3.2.2.1 Firm Size and Operating Performance 
To examine the relation between firm size and operating performance, the 
sample is split into two groups by the median of average total assets of issuers from 
Year —3 to Year -1. The median of average total assets is HK$609.112 million. If the 
average total assets data is not available in the data sources, the observation is 
dropped from the sample. In this section, 22 observations are excluded. 
3.2.2.2 Market Transaction Volume and Operating Performance 
To examine the effect of market transaction volume, the sample is separated into 
two groups by the median turnover volume in Year 0. The turnover volume is the 
number of shares traded for a stock in a particular period and the median turnover 
volume in Year 0 is 183.129 million shares. Data is collected in the DataStream and 
if the turnover volume in Year 0 is not available in the source, the observation is 
dropped. In this section, 18 observations are excluded. 
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3.2.2.3 Dividend Payout Ratio and Operating Performance 
For the effect of dividend payout ratio, the sample is divided into two groups: 
high- and low-payout issuers by the median of dividend payout ratio of the SEO 
firms in Year 0. Originally, the payout ratio is obtained in the DataStream, however, 
more than half of the figures are missing and the data in the PACAP is not 
compatible. Therefore, to avoid bias, the dividend payout ratio is defined as the cash 
dividends per share multiplied by the number of shares outstanding and divided by 
the net income. Cash dividends per share represent the total dividends actually paid 
to common stockholders in the form of cash during the year. The number of shares 
outstanding represents the number of shares of common stock outstanding at the end 
of the year while the net income is the published net profit in annual reports. Data is 
collected from the PACAP and the median dividend payout ratio is 11.29 percent. 
Similar to previous subsections, SEOs without available dividend payout ratio in the 
PACAP are dropped. As a result, 61 SEOs are dropped. 
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3.2.2.4 Other Corporate Governance Variables and 
Operating Performance 
To examine the effects of ownership concentration and family ownership on the 
operating performance and the performance decline, two proxies are employed, 
namely the percentage owned by the five largest owners and the identity of the 
largest shareholder. The percentage owned by the five largest owners is defined as 
the voting rights share of the five largest owners in percentage of total outstanding 
shares while the identity of the largest owner is either a widely-held company, a 
widely-held financial institution, a family, or the state, or the ownership structure is 
dispersed. The two proxies represent the ownership concentration and family 
ownership respectively, and the data are obtained from Claessens, Djankov and Lang 
(2000). Since only data at the end of 1996 is available in the data set, the percentage 
owned by the five largest owners and the identity of the largest shareholder 
represents ownership structure at the end of 1996. Issuers are assumed not to face 
great changes in ownership structure and ownership structures of issuers around the 
SEOs are similar to that in 1996. Since the period analyzed is 1991-1999，it is 
reasonable to assume ownership structure does not face dramatic changes within a 
few years. 
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The two effects are analyzed separately. First, the sample is split by the median 
percentage owned by the five largest owners. The median is 35 percent. Second, the 
sample is classified into two groups (family and non-family ownership) by the 
identity of the largest shareholder to distinguish whether the largest shareholder of an 
SEO is a family. If the ownership structure data is not available in Claessens, 
Djankov and Lang (2000)，the observation is dropped. In this section, 406 
observations are excluded. 
3.2.3 Price Performance of SEO Issuers 
After the analysis of operating performance, the price performance of issuers is 
analyzed. To examine the price reaction on issuers, buy-and-hold aftermarket returns 
over one- to five-day, one-, two- and three-year time windows relative to the day 
prior to the announcement date of the SEO (it is denoted as Day —1; Day t is t day(s) 
after the announcement date where t = 0, +1，+2，+3，+4, +5; Year t is t year(s) after 
the announcement date where t = +1, +2, +3) are computed. The short period returns 
(in days) are proxies of investors' reaction on the announcement of SEO while the 
longer period returns (in years) reflect the long-run market correction on the decline 
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in operating performance and overvalued stocks. The stock price is the closing price 
on the day concerned. The returns are calculated relative to Day —1 and are simply 
the percentage changes of closing price within the time windows. It represents how 
the prices of SEOs change between the time intervals. 
The period analyzed is the same but two changes are made on the sample in the 
analysis of operating performance. First, no matter how many times a listed company 
issues SEOs in a year, all issues in the year are included. To be specific, multiple 
issues are not omitted because unlike in the analysis of operating performance, there 
will not be double counting of ratios at the end of each year. Since every observation 
may be informative, it is inappropriate to omit any observation. Second, observations 
without an announcement date in the Hong Kong Economic Journal Monthly or the 
Stock Exchange Fact Book are dropped. Other selection criteria are the same as 
before. In the analysis of profitability, the number of observations is 925 while it is 
1165 in the analysis of price performance. 
The return is unadjusted for industry and market because the effect should tend 
to be zero when the industries of SEOs are well diversified and the announcement 
date locates evenly in the nine years concerned. That means returns of an industry 
47 
and market cannot dominate the mean returns computed. Announcement dates are 
obtained from either the Hong Kong Economic Journal Monthly or the Stock 
Exchange Fact Book while the stock prices are collected from the DataStream. Since 
stock returns are assumed to be normal, t-statistics (two-tailed) are reported in the 
analysis of price performance. 
3.2.4 Determinants of Operating Performance Decline and Price 
Performance 
As it will be documented, larger issuers, higher turnover issuers and higher 
payout issuers experience larger post-issue operating performance decline. To 
examine if the difference persists in price reaction and whether the investors respond 
rationally on the difference in decline, for each determinant, the sample is split into 
two groups based on the classifications in Section 3.2.2. That means if an SEO 
belongs to small group, high-turnover group and low-payout group in Section 3.2.2, 
this SEO belongs to the same groups in the analysis of price performance. 
The sample is not split by the median of proxies in order to analyze the price 
12 When the announcement and the long-run effect are compared to the mean return in industries and 
in the market, the announcement effect is still positive and the long-run effect is still negative. 
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reaction upon the difference in decline in Section 3.2.2.^^ If an observation is 
dropped in corresponding subsections in Section 3.2.2 due to missing data of proxies, 
the observation is dropped in this section. In addition, since the number of issues by a 
firm in a single year is not restricted, the numbers of observations are different 
between groups. 
The mean percentage changes in different time intervals are computed for each 
group in each determinant, and the mean percentage changes are compared. The 
reported significance levels are based on the two-tailed t-test. The null hypothesis is 
that the mean percentage changes from the two groups are identical. In comparison 
between two means in each determinant, variances are not assumed to be equal. 
Results are similar when the sample is split by the median of the proxies. 
14 In this section, the results are not materially affected by the assumption that variances are not equal. 
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Chapter IV 
RESULTS ON OPERATING PERFORMANCE 
In this chapter, the results on operating performance and performance decline 
are shown. The operating performance of SEO firms is investigated. Then several 
possible determinants of the operating performance change are examined through 
testing of several major factors in the Corporate Governance theories. 
4.1 Operating Performance of SEO Issuers 
The medians of net profit margin and pre-tax return on assets are presented in 
Figure 1. Panel A shows the median net profit margin in the years after SEOs. The 
median of net profit margin declines continuously from 6.695 percent in Year -1 to 
3.086 percent in Year +1 and 1.400 percent in Year +3. The median net profit margin 
becomes one-fifth of the Year -1 level after four years. 
The medians pre-tax return on assets are reported in Panel B. Similar to the net 
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profit margin, the median pre-tax return on assets is at a peak in Year -1 (3.463 
percent) and drops sharply after the offering until a slight rise in Year +3 (when it 
becomes 1.009 percent). Results in both panels suggest that the medians of 
accounting ratios are dropping after SEOs. 
The median changes in operating performance of SEO issuers are measured 
relative to Year -1 and Year 0，and are reported in Table 2. Panel A presents the 
median change in net profit margin for different periods and shows a statistically 
significant and negative median change in net profit margin. The median changes in 
net profit margin from Year -1 to Year +1, Year +2 and Year +3 are -3.773 percent, 
-6.380 percent and —6.602 percent respectively while the median changes from Year 
0 to Year +1, Year +2 and Year +3 are -1.468 percent, -4.161 percent and -4.250 
percent respectively. All the median changes are significant at the 0.01 level. 
Panel B reports the median change in pre-tax return on assets. All the median 
changes of different time windows relative to Year -1 and Year 0 are negative and 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The median changes vary from -1.241 
percent to -4.712 percent. It should be mentioned that in the two panels of the table, 
no matter which accounting ratio is employed, the median changes in ratios relative 
to Year —1 are larger in magnitude than those relative to Year 0. It may suggest that 
51 
the operating performance of SEO firms is the highest in Year - 1 among the years 
and the firms exhibit declines continuously after the issue. This is consistent with the 
Windows of Opportunity Theory that managers time the issue when the firm values 
are at their peaks. 
Employing a different methodology to exclude SEOs on a three-year basis, the 
sample consisting of 351 observations shows similar post-issue deterioration in 
profitability that maintains robustness of the analysis. 
In summary, there are significant declines in operating performance of SEO 
issuers subsequent to the offerings. The declines do not merely occur from Year -1 to 
Year 0, but also in subsequent years. It suggests that managers may time the issue 
when the earning ratios are at their peaks in Year - 1 to reduce cost of equity and the 
operating performance declines after the issue (Year 0 and later on). The result is 
consistent with the prediction of the theories that: 1) the manager invests in negative 
present value projects with the proceeds from SEOs; 2) the manager obtains insider 
information and times the issue when the operating performance is at a peak; 3) the 
investors are over-optimistic about the future earning power of SEO issuers; 4) the 
manager manipulates earnings before SEOs and adjusts the overstated earnings in 
post-issue period. The result is consistent with analyses obtained in other mature 
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capital markets such as the United States (Loughran and Ritter (1997) and 
McLaughlin, Safieddine and Vasudevan (1996)) and Japan (Cai and Loughran 
(1998)). 
4.2 Determinants of Operating Performance 
As shown in the last section, SEO issuers experience a significant decline in 
profitability after they issue SEOs. In this section, possible determinants of the 
post-issue decline are examined. Several corporate governance variables, namely 
firm size, market transaction volume, dividend payout ratio, degree of ownership 
concentration and family ownership are analyzed in the following subsections. The 
literature review is detailed in Section 2.2. 
4.2.1 Firm Size and Operating Performance 
Theorists suggest that large firms are more likely to be properly governed and 
monitored, protect minority investors well and get financing more easily. Therefore, 
large issuers should be more profitable and face smaller post-issue declines in 
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profitability compared to small issuers. 
To examine if there is any difference in operating performance and performance 
decline after SEOs for large and small issuers, the sample is split into two groups by 
the median of average total assets of issuers from Year - 3 to Year -1. Figure 2 
presents the operating performance of SEO firms split by the median of average total 
assets of issuers from Year —3 to Year -1. The ratios from the two groups are tested 
with the Wilcoxon Two-Sample Signed Rank Test. The null hypothesis is that the 
distributions of ratios from the two groups are identical. Panel A reports the net profit 
margin from Year —1 to Year +3. The medians of net profit margin are larger in large 
issuers than in small issuers. For example, the median net profit margin in Year -1 is 
7.865 percent and 5.332 percent for the large and small issuers respectively while the 
same ratio in Year +3 is 3.150 percent and 0.415 percent respectively. All differences 
are significant at the 0.01 level and it suggests that large firms are more profitable 
than small firms. Meanwhile, decreases in the median net profit margin are observed 
for both groups, which are in line with the results in the last subsection. 
Panel B illustrates the pre-tax return on assets for the two groups and the result 
is slightly different from that of Panel A. The medians of pre-tax return on assets of 
large issuers are larger than those of small issuers only in post-issue period. The 
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major reason for the difference in results between Panel A and Panel B in Year -1 
and Year 0 is that the denominator of the ratio in Panel B is total assets，so that 
issuers with large average total assets in Year - 3 to Year - 1 possess worse pre-tax 
return on assets than small issuers do. However, this effect is dominated by the 
profitability of large issuers after the SEOs. The distributions in Year -1, Year +2 and 
Year +3 are significantly different at the 0.1, 0.01 and 0.05 level respectively and 
both types of firms exhibit declines in medians of accounting ratios. 
Loughran and Ritter (1997) compute the median ratios in four size quartiles, and 
compare the distribution with the ratios of matched non-issuers. They find that the 
decline in median ratios from Year 0 to Year +4 is the largest in the quartile of the 
smallest issuers. They conclude that the SEO issuers in that quartile tend to 
experience a larger decline than issuers in the quartile of the largest issuers do. Their 
method, nonetheless, does not compare or test the distributions between different size 
quartiles directly. Therefore, a different methodology is employed. 
In Table 3, the changes in operating performance of large and small issuers are 
compared. The changes in net profit margin over different periods are presented in 
Panel A. Both small and large issuers experience significant post-SEO operating 
performance declines, but the declines in net profit margin of small issuers are larger 
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than that of large issuers in all periods except in the first time interval. Moreover, the 
differences in Year - 1 to Year +2 and Year 0 to Year +2 are statistically significant at 
the 0.05 level. It suggests that smaller issuers exhibit larger post-issue net profit 
margin declines up to Year +2. 
Panel B compares the difference in the decline of pre-tax return on assets for the 
two groups. There are significant declines in pre-tax return on assets in both groups 
of issuers but the deterioration is more severe for smaller issuers. The differences are 
substantiated by the Wilcoxon Two-Sample Signed Rank Test (at least at the 0.1 
level). Combining the results in Panel A and Panel B，we see that although the 
differences are not always significant in all time windows in Panel A, results in Panel 
B strongly suggest that small issuers experience larger declines in operating 
performance than large issuers do. 
In summary, large SEO issuers show superior operating performance relative to 
small SEO issuers. The result is consistent with the theories suggesting that large 
corporations are good at corporate governance and investor protection. Besides, both 
groups experience declines in operating performance but the declines in operating 
performance are larger for smaller issuers, which is also consistent with the theories. 
The results suggest that opportunistic behaviors are more costly in large firms than in 
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small firms and investors have more incentives to monitor large firms than small 
firms. The result is also consistent with the empirical study by Loughran and Ritter 
(1997). 
4.2.2 Market Transaction Volume and Operating 
Performance 
In the last section, it is shown that larger issuers are more profitable and face 
less deterioration in earning. A related factor, market transaction volume, which 
indicates corporate governance, is examined in this subsection. Because of better 
monitoring and less asymmetric information in companies, large-market-transaction 
issuers should be more profitable and face smaller declines in operating performance 
than low-market-transaction issuers do. 
The operating performance of SEO firms split by the median turnover volume 
in Year 0, which is a proxy of market transaction volume, is reported in Figure 3. 
Panel A of the figure reports the median net profit margin from Year —1 to Year +3. 
The median net profit margin decreases gradually after SEOs for both groups of 
issuers, which is consistent with the results mentioned above. The medians of net 
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profit margin are larger in the high-turnover issuers than the low-turnover issuers. 
For example, the median net profit margin in Year - 1 is 8.16 percent and 4.986 
percent for the high- and low-turnover issuers respectively while the same ratio in 
Year +3 is 3.77 percent and 0.303 percent respectively. All differences are significant 
at least at the 0.1 level, which support the argument that high-turnover firms are more 
profitable than low-turnover firms. 
Panel B illustrates the pre-tax return on assets for the two groups and it further 
reinforces the argument that high-turnover issuers show superior profitability relative 
to low-turnover issuers. The medians of pre-tax return on assets of high-turnover 
issuers are larger than that of low-turnover issuers in all years and the distributions in 
four out of the five years are significantly different at least at the 0.1 level. As in 
Panel A, both types of firms exhibit declines in median pre-tax return on assets in the 
post-SEO period. 
Table 4 presents the change in operating performance of SEO firms split by 
median turnover volume in Year 0. In Panel A, change in the net profit margin is 
shown. As the results in this chapter show, both groups experience statistically 
significant declines in net profit margin at least at the 0.1 level. When comparing the 
median changes in net profit margin, the declines are larger in high-turnover issuers 
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than in low-turnover issuers only in time windows up to Year +1. However, it is only 
partially supported by the statistical test since only one of the differences is 
statistically significant (at the 0.05 level). As time progresses, the declines are larger 
in low-turnover SEOs than in high-turnover SEOs and the differences are statistically 
significant at least at the 0.1 level. The finding suggests that the post-issue decline is 
slightly larger for high-turnover SEOs than low-turnover SEOs within one year after 
the SEOs but the relation is drastically reversed after one year from the SEOs. 
In Panel B, the change in pre-tax return on assets is reported. Both types of 
issuers experience significant post-SEO declines in the ratio (at least at the 0.05 
level). Similar to the results shown in Panel A, the declines in low-turnover SEOs are 
larger than that in high-turnover SEOs after one year from SEOs. The differences in 
those periods are in general, statistically significant. 
In summary, high-turnover issuers are more profitable than low-turnover issuers. 
The results agree with the theory suggesting that investors of high-turnover 
corporations, i.e. those receive more attention, devote more efforts and resources to 
monitor the managers than in low-turnover corporations. Consistent with the results 
in previous sections, both groups experience post-issue operating performance 
declines but the drops are in general larger for low-turnover issuers than for 
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high-turnover issuers. The drops are similar within one year from SEOs but become 
significantly different after one year. It suggests effective monitoring can reduce 
opportunistic behavior of manager after SEOs. 
4.2.3 Dividend Payout Ratio and Operating Performance 
In the previous subsections, it is shown that firm size and market transaction 
volume are determinants of post-issue decline. The results are consistent with the 
major Corporate Governance theories. In this section, the effect of another corporate 
governance variable, namely dividend payout ratio, is addressed. 
According to La Porta et al. (2000), dividends are "outcomes of investor 
protection" and "substitutes for investor protection". In the first view, dividend 
payout ratio is positively related to investor protection, while in the second view, the 
worse is the protection on investors, the more the firms are willing to payout 
dividend for signaling effects. Based on these two views, the theoretical predictions 
are inconclusive. 
The sample is divided into two groups: high- and low-payout issuers by the 
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median of dividend payout ratio of the SEO firms in Year 0. Figure 4 presents the 
operating performance of high- and low-payout issuers. Panel A reports the net profit 
margin of the two types of issuers. The median net profit margin of high-payout 
issuers is consistently larger than that of low-payout issuers during the five years and 
the differences are statistically significant at the 0.01 level in all years. Except the 
value in Year -1, the medians of net profit margin for low-payout issuers are 
.significantly negative (at the 0.01 level). 
Panel B shows the pre-tax return on assets in the two groups. Again, the median 
pre-tax return on assets for the high-payout group is larger than that of the 
low-payout group and the differences are significant at the 0.01 level. The medians 
of pre-tax profit for low-payout issuers are significantly negative at the 0.01 level in 
all five years. 
Both Panel A and B illustrate that high-payout issuers perform much better than 
low-payout issuers do. The result is not surprising. Most low-payout issuers are 
making loss and there is a direct relation between dividend payout ratio and 
profitability, it is therefore difficult to conclude that the investor protection of 
high-payout firms is better than that of low-payout firms. 
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Table 5 indicates the change in operating performance for the two groups. The 
changes in net profit margin for the high- and low-payout groups are shown in Panel 
A. The result is consistent with the theories in Chapter II that for both groups, net 
profit margin declines. The largest median change is -7.983 percent and -4.760 
percent in high- and low-payout groups respectively and all the medians are 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
The deterioration is more severe for the high-payout group than the low-payout 
group. The median declines in net profit margin of low-payout issuers are smaller 
than that of high-payout issuers in all time windows but only the differences in three 
time intervals are statistically significant (at least at the 0.1 level). The distributions 
are statistically different when considering longer time horizon up to Year +3. 
Panel B of Table 5 provides the median change in pre-tax return on assets for 
the two types of issuers. The result is similar to the finding in Panel A. Both groups 
experience post-SEO deterioration in pre-tax return on assets and the median 
declines in different time windows are consistently larger for high-payout issuers 
than low-payout issuers. The difference is substantiated by the significance test (at 
the 0.01 level). 
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In summary, the high-payout group is more profitable than the low-payout 
group, which is consistently making loss. While both groups exhibit post-issue 
operating performance declines, the high-payout group experiences larger post-SEO 
declines than the low-payout group does. The declines are consistent with the results 
abovementioned that managers misuse the cash flow obtained from SEOs. The 
differences in declines agree with the view that dividends are signals and substitutes 
for investor protection. High-payout firms implement high payout policy to signal 
that they protect investors and attract investors in the SEOs. However, they face large 
declines in operating performance after SEO. The finding is similar to that of 
McLaughlin, Safieddine and Vasudevan (2000)，who find that high information 
asymmetry firms are more willing to pay high fee for reputable underwriters to 
produce signals that they have less private information. 
4.2.4 Other Corporate Governance Variables and Operating 
Performance 
It is found that firm size, market transaction volume and dividend policy are 
influential in determining the operating performance and performance decline in the 
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post-SEO period. However, none of the factors are about the ownership structure of 
corporations. In this section, the effects of ownership structure such as ownership 
concentration and family ownership on operating performance are examined. 
Concentrated ownership and family ownership improve operating performance 
of companies because of effective monitoring. However, if poor legal protection of 
minority shareholder, pyramid and cross-holding structures are prevalent, the costs of 
those forms of ownership are possible expropriation of controlling shareholders from 
the companies. Therefore, the effects of concentrated ownership and family 
ownership on profitability are inconclusive. 
Figure 5 presents the operating performance of SEO firms split by the median 
percentage owned by the five largest owners at the end of 1996, which is a proxy of 
ownership concentration. The difference in ratios from the two groups is tested with 
the Wilcoxon Two-Sample Signed Rank Test and the null hypothesis is that the 
distributions of ratios from the two groups are identical. Panel A reports the net profit 
margin for the two groups. The net profit margin of the low-ownership-concentration 
issuers is consistently higher than that of the high-ownership-concentration issuers. 
The differences are statistically significant at least at the 0.05 level. 
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Panel B shows the pre-tax return on assets of the two groups. The result is 
different. Low-ownership-concentration SEOs shows similar profitability from Year 
-1 to Year +2 and superior profitability in Year +3 relative to 
high-ownership-concentration SEOs. The difference is only statistically significant in 
Year +3. Based on the findings in both panels, low-ownership-concentration issuers 
are slightly more profitable than high-ownership-concentration issuers. 
Table 6 indicates the change in operating performance for high- and 
low-ownership-concentration issuers. Panel A illustrates the change in net profit 
margin for the two groups. While both groups experience significant post-issue 
operating performance deterioration, the low-ownership-concentration issuers show 
less deterioration compared to high-ownership-concentration issuers, but the 
difference is not substantiated by the Wilcoxon Two-Sample Signed Rank Test. 
Panel B presents the change in pre-tax return on assets for the two groups. 
Pre-tax return on assets decreases in subsequent years for both groups and the 
median declines are larger for issuers with higher ownership concentration. The 
difference is only significant in three time windows. With the results in Panel A, the 
difference in profitability declines is not pronounced, suggesting that ownership 
concentration does not remarkably affect the post-issue decline in earnings. 
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To examine the effect of family ownership, the sample is classified into two 
groups (family and non-family ownership) by the identity of the largest shareholder. 
Figure 6 presents the operating performance of family- and non-family-owned SEOs. 
Panel A and Panel B show the net profit margin and the pre-tax return on assets of 
the two groups respectively. In Panel A, the medians of net profit margin are larger 
for non-family-owned issuers than family-owned issuers while in Panel B, the 
relation is reversed. However, none of the differences are statistically significant (at 
the 0.1 level). The results suggest that family ownership may be beneficial to 
supervision of managers but also incur costs as the controlling family shareholders 
may extract private benefit in the expense of minority shareholders. 
The change in operating performance of family- and non-family-owned issuers 
is shown in Table 7. Panel A presents the median change in net profit margin and 
Panel B presents the median change in pre-tax return on assets. No matter which 
accounting ratios are employed, operating performance of both family- and 
non-family-owned SEOs deteriorates significantly after the issues (at least at the 0.05 
level). The declines are larger for non-family-owned issuers than family-owned 
issuers in Panel A but the relation is reversed in Panel B. However, the difference in 
declines between the two groups is not substantiated by the Wilcoxon Two-Sample 
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Signed Rank Test. It suggests that family ownership is not a determinant of the 
post-issue deterioration. 
In summary, operating performance of low-ownership-concentration issuers is 
slightly better than that of high-ownership-concentration issuers. The result is 
contradictory to the finding of Wruck (1989). In the analysis of family ownership, 
neither group achieves better operating performance than the other group. No matter 
how the groups are classified, all the four groups inevitably face operating 
performance declines after their issues. This result is supportive of the four theories. 
The decline is not affected by the degree of ownership concentration and family 
ownership. The findings suggest that the ownership structures may improve 
monitoring on managers but also make expropriation possible for large shareholders 
in East Asia economy, where pyramid and cross-holding structures are common. In 
these kinds of ownership structure, the costs cancel out the benefits. 
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Chapter V 
RESULTS ON PRICE PERFORMANCE 
In the last chapter, it was found that the operating performance of SEOs 
deteriorates after their issues and several determinants of the decline such as firm 
size, market transaction volume and dividend payout ratio are found. In this chapter, 
price reactions from the market about the issues will be examined through 
decomposing the price effect into announcement effect and long-run effect. In 
Section 5.1，the price performance of SEOs is presented while in Section 5.2, price 
performance of groups of different determinants of decline is illustrated. The 
literature review is detailed in Section 2.3 and 2.4. 
5.1 Price Performance of SEO Issuers 
In Section 4.1，the operating performance change of the SEO issuers in the 
post-issue period is examined and a significant decline for the SEO issuers is found. 
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The result is consistent with the major theories concerning operating performance 
decline after issuance. In this section, the market reaction on the announcements of 
SEOs will be investigated. 
Table 8 describes the stock price performance of 1165 SEO issuers. Panel A 
reports the announcement effect. The mean stock returns vary from 1.493 to 3.327 
percent for zero to five days relative to the day prior to the announcement (Day -1). 
The mean returns are positive and in an uptrend around the announcement. All the 
means are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Negative announcement effect is 
not found even though the time intervals are up to five days after the announcement. 
In Panel B, the long-run effect is presented. The one-, two- and three-year 
returns are 1.710 percent, -28.047 percent and -32.912 percent respectively. The 
figures become more negative when time progresses and only the last two are 
significantly different from zero (at the 0.01 level). The long-run underperformance 
is consistent with the major prior studies such as Loughran and Ritter (1995), Spiess 
and Affleck-Graves (1995) and Stehle, Ehrhardt and Przyborowsky (2000). 
There are several possible explanations for this finding. First, there are 
asymmetric information problems. Investors do not anticipate the decline of 
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post-issue operating performance as insiders do, so they do not correct the 
overvaluation after the announcement and hence no negative announcement effect is 
present. 
The Market Over-optimism Theory is another possible interpretation. Instead of 
negative announcement effect, positive announcement effect occurs and implies that 
investors are too optimistic about the future firm values of SEOs. Nevertheless, in the 
long run, investors discover their errors in forecasts through observing the post-issue 
operating performance deterioration, so they correct their valuations on the SEO 
firms. 
Another possibility is the Windows of Opportunity Hypothesis. Both the 
announcement and the long-run effect suggest that the stock is overvalued around the 
time of issues. Managers, who have insider information about the over-valuation, 
time the issues very well and know when the market cannot truly estimate the firm 
value. As a result, managers take advantage of the sales of overpriced stocks. 
Also, the market fails to perceive the announcement of SEO as a signal of sales 
of overpriced stocks. If the market understands and treats all SEOs as sales of 
overvalued stocks, negative announcement effect and neutral long-run effect are 
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expected. Besides, the market fails to estimate the degree of over-valuation. Even 
they perceive such a signal, they may not correctly re-estimate the true value of 
stocks. Therefore, there are negative long-run effects. 
It is worth noticing that the non-negative announcement effect sharply contrasts 
that in previous studies obtained in the United States, Japan and Germany (for 
example, Smith (1986) and McLaughlin, Safieddine and Vasudevan (2000)). Apart 
from the theoretical interpretations, there are several differences between stock 
market in Hong Kong and those in other mature capital markets explaining the 
difference in findings. 
Unlike those in mature capital markets, Hong Kong SEOs possess smaller sizes 
and turnover volumes that make manipulation on stock price easy. Shareholders and 
underwriters can boost stock prices by increasing their stakes or recommending 
others to hold the stocks. Therefore, there will be positive announcement period 
return. As it will be shown, smaller SEOs and SEOs with larger turnover volume 
experience larger positive announcement effect. 
Besides, most firms issue more than one SEO during the period, therefore, 
shareholders have adequate incentive to stabilize the stock prices so that they can 
71 
raise more fund in subsequent SEOs. In the sample, 67 percent of SEOs issue more 
than one SEO within the period. 
5.2 Determinants of Operating Performance Decline and 
Price Performance 
In Chapter IV, three determinants of the profitability declines are found, namely 
firm size, market transaction volume and dividend payout ratio. Significant 
differences in profitability declines are found when the sample is separated into 
groups by the proxies of the determinants. Therefore, in this section, the 
announcement and the long-run effects of those groups are analyzed. 
It is shown that larger issuers, higher turnover issuers and higher payout issuers 
experience larger post-issue operating performance decline. To examine if the 
difference persists in price performance and whether investors respond rationally on 
the difference in declines, the sample is split into groups based on the classifications 
in Chapter IV. 
The stock price performance of large and small issuers is reported in Table 9. 
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Panel A documents the returns around the announcement date. The mean 
announcement period returns vary from 1.442 percent to 1.909 percent for large 
issuers while those of small issuers vary from 1.558 percent to 4.809 percent. All the 
figures are statistically significant (at least at the 0.1 level for large firms and the 0.01 
level for small firms). It suggests that issuers, no matter in which group, exhibit 
positive announcement effects. Comparing the mean returns between the two groups, 
the difference is significant in five time intervals (at least at the 0.1 level), suggesting 
that the announcement period returns of small issuers are superior to large issuers. 
Panel B presents the long-run effect and shows that both types of issuers 
experience long-run stock price declines. The one-, two- and three-year mean returns 
for large issuers are -8.027 percent, -28.718 percent and -31.212 percent respectively. 
Meanwhile, the mean return for small issuers is 15.380 percent in the first year, but 
drops to -26.522 percent and -33.506 percent after that. All the figures are 
significantly different from zero (at least at the 0.1 level). The t-test statistics suggest 
that the difference is significant in one-year return but not in other time intervals. 
Figure 7 illustrates that the stock prices are decreasing as time progresses. 
Table 10 demonstrates the stock price performance of high- and low-turnover 
firms. Panel A reports positive announcement effects for both types of issuers. Most 
73 
of the returns in the announcement period are significantly different from zero at 
least at the 0.1 level while the t-statistics substantiate that the mean returns for 
low-turnover issuers are larger than that of high-turnover issuers. In Panel B, the 
long-run effect is shown. The long-run returns are negative for high-turnover issuers 
and only the one-year return is not significantly different from zero (at the 0.1 level). 
The long-run return for low-turnover issuer is significantly positive in the first year 
(at the 0.05 level) and significantly negative after the first year (at the 0.01 level). 
The difference is significant in one-year return and three-year return. It reveals that in 
the announcement period, the returns of the low-turnover firms are higher than those 
of the high-turnover firms, but the relation tends to be reversed in the long run as 
shown in Figure 8. 
The price performance for high- and low-payout groups is reported in Table 11. 
In Panel A, a significantly positive announcement effect (ten figures are statistically 
significant at least at the 0.1 level) is shown in both groups but the mean returns are 
larger in the low-payout group than in the high-payout group. The difference, in 
general, is statistically significant. In Panel B, the long-run effect is negative and 
significant at least at the 0.05 level for the high-payout issuers. The low-payout 
issuers, however, experience rises in stock price during the first year after the 
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announcement but then the price drops dramatically in later years. All the mean 
percentages are significantly different from zero (two at the 0.01 level and one at the 
0.1 level). The difference in mean returns is statistically significant in the long run (at 
least at the 0.05 level). The patterns are presented in Figure 9. 
To summarize the findings and illustrate the trends clearly, Figure 7，8 and 9 are 
shown. The patterns are similar in the three figures. In general, prices rise in the 
announcement period for all the groups and the mean returns are larger for larger 
issuers, higher turnover issuers and higher payout issuers. In the long run, prices drop 
dramatically. For large SEOs, high-turnover SEOs and high-payout SEOs, the drops 
begin in the first year while for others, declines occur after the first year. The 
decreases in mean returns eventually become larger when the firm size, the market 
transaction volume and the dividend payout ratio are smaller. 
After the results of stock price performance and the operating performance in 
Chapter IV are compared, there are two noteworthy observations. First, there are 
positive announcement period returns and substantially negative long-run effects in 
all groups. The result is in line with that in Section 5.1. The post-issue operating 
performance deteriorations in Chapter IV should be associated with negative 
announcement effects, but no negative announcement effect is observed. The 
75 
investors, due to information asymmetry, fail to anticipate the decline in operating 
performance and they revalue the SEOs when they know the decline in profitability 
in the long run. 
Also, the market is over-optimistic about the future earning power of SEOs, 
therefore investors overlook the overvalued stocks. During the announcement period, 
there is an upward trend in general up to five days after the announcement. For some 
groups, the positive sentiment continues until one year after the announcement. 
Therefore, the over-optimism is severe. 
Another possible interpretation is that managers take advantage of the windows 
of opportunity to sell over-priced stocks. The managers, who are able to anticipate a 
decline in profitability, sell over-valued stocks before the decline. However, the 
market fails to understand the intention of the managers and does not react correctly 
on signals of selling overpriced stocks. 
The second remarkable observation is that the groups with better profitability 
and less deterioration in profitability are more likely to experience smaller returns in 
announcement period. In Section 4.2.1 (Section 4.2.2), it is shown that large firms 
(high-turnover firms) are more profitable and exhibit smaller post-SEO declines in 
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profitability than small firms (low-turnover firms) do. However, in the announcement 
period, their returns are less than that of small firms (low-turnover firms). The 
surprising results suggest that investors do not anticipate the difference in changes of 
post-issue firm value, and therefore they do not react correctly on the announcement 
of SEOs. One possible reason for the errors may be the fact that investors simply 
treat less profitable firms as more potential firms and invest in them. 
The errors are corrected as time progresses. That is why the long-run effect 
tends to be reversed in longer time horizon. The three-year mean return of large 
issuers (high-turnover issuers) is larger than that of small issuers (low-turnover 
issuers). It suggests that market investors fail to distinguish the overvaluation as well 
as the profitability of firms in different groups in the short run. 
As for dividend payout ratio, the observation is different. High-payout firms, 
which are more profitable but experience larger declines, exhibit smaller 
announcement effects than low-payout firms do. Investors, again simply project less 
profitable firm to high-future-growth firm. Therefore, the announcement effect is 
larger for low-payout issuers than high-payout issuers. Nevertheless, in the long run, 
the returns of high-payout issuers are less negative compared to low-payout issuers 
after Year +1. One explanation is that the low-payout firms are consistently making 
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losses. In Figure 4，for low-payout SEOs, the median net profit margin in Year +2 
and Year +3 is -7.691 percent and —6.940 percent respectively while the pre-tax 
return on assets in Year +2 and Year +3 is -4.205 percent and -2.756 percent 
respectively. After observing those accounting ratios, investors no longer believe that 
low-payout issuers will become profitable, so the drop is larger for low-payout 
issuers than high-payout issuers. 
In summary, investors are over-optimistic about the prospect of SEOs and do 
not respond efficiently to the overvaluation in the announcement period. Meanwhile, 
managers time the issue very well. As a result, investors correct the overpricing in 
the long run. Also, market investors are not able to distinguish the degree of 




This thesis analyzes a sample of 925 seasoned equity offerings in Hong Kong 
from 1991 to 1999 for operating performance and its changes. Two measures of 
profitability, namely net profit margin and pre-tax return on assets are employed. 
Consistent with many other studies (for example, McLaughlin, Safieddine and 
Vasudevan, 1996; Loughran and Ritter, 1997), post-SEO profitability deterioration is 
also a common phenomenon in Hong Kong as in other large and sophisticated equity 
markets. SEO issuers exhibit a dramatic and statistically significant decline in 
profitability after new equity offerings. The median change in net profit margin of 
the sample issuers is -6.602 percent from one year prior to the offering to four years 
later while the median change in pre-tax return on assets is -4.498 percent. The 
median net profit margin and median pre-tax return on assets also fall from one year 
prior to the offering to four years later. 
The findings are consistent with the prediction of the four theories in Chapter II: 
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the Free Cash Flow Theory, the Windows of Opportunity Theory, the Market 
Over-optimism Theory and the Earning Management Theory. The Free Cash Flow 
Theory states that managers issue SEOs to increase proceeds for private benefit and 
the proceeds are usually misused due to agency problems. In the Windows of 
Opportunity Theory, managers who are better informed than outsiders, issue SEOs 
when they foresee profitability deterioration. The Market Over-optimism Theory 
states that investors are too optimistic about the prospect of issuers and overlook the 
decline in profitability. In the Earning Management Theory, managers issue SEOs 
after manipulation on earning announcement in order to reduce cost of equity and 
investors are fooled by the manipulated figures. 
The patterns are robust for groups of different firm sizes, market transaction 
volumes, dividend payout ratios, degrees of ownership concentration and types of 
ownership. Firm size, market transaction volume and dividend payout ratio are found 
to be the determinants of the profitability decline of the sample issuers. The 
post-SEO profitability deterioration is more severe for smaller issuers, lower market 
transaction issuers and higher dividend payout issuers. Degree of ownership 
concentration and family ownership are not determinants of the post-issue 
deterioration. The results indicate that larger firms and larger market transaction 
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firms are more profitable and experience smaller post-issue profitability deterioration. 
Firms paying more dividends are merely producing signals of investor protection but 
not reducing the deterioration. The findings, however, do not support a corporate 
governance role for concentrated ownership and family ownership. 
To examine investors' rationality towards the post-issue declines in profitability, 
price reactions are analyzed. Surprisingly, positive announcement period returns and 
negative long-run returns are found for the 1165 announcements of Hong Kong 
SEOs from 1991 to 1999. The mean return of the sample SEOs from one day prior to 
the announcement date to six days later is 3.327 percent. The mean three-year return 
is -32.912 percent. The results reveal that investors are too optimistic about the future 
earning power of SEOs and managers may take advantage of the opportunity to issue 
equity. Other than the Market Over-optimism Theory and the Windows of 
Opportunity Theory, investors fail to interpret SEO announcements as signals of 
over-valuations. 
The positive announcement period returns and the negative long-run returns 
persist when dividing issuers into groups of different firm sizes, market transaction 
volumes and dividend payout ratios. Moreover, investors fail to anticipate the 
difference in profitability declines in different groups and fail to revalue groups of 
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issuers with larger declines in profitability shortly after the announcements. The 
results support the Windows of Opportunity Theory and the Market Over-optimism 
Theory. 
Although the results are consistent with the four major explanations for the 
post-SEO decline in profitability and firm value, the results on the operating 
performance and the price reaction of issuers provide partial evidence in support of 
the Free Cash Flow Theory and the Earning Management Theory because whether 
managers extract private benefits from SEOs and whether managers manipulate 
earnings are difficult to observe. Besides, neither of the managerial ownership, "Free 
Cash Flow" from McLaughlin, Safieddine and Vasudevan (1996), nor discretionary 
accruals are measured. Also, no control like REITs in the U.S. is present in Hong 
Kong. 
The profitability deterioration and long-run underperformance of issuers suggest 
that managers sell over-valued stocks during seasoned equity offerings, but whether 
managers anticipate the deterioration and intentionally mislead investors is unknown. 
There are two possibilities. First, as Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest, managers who 
anticipate profitability deterioration issue equity when investors fail to predict the 
decline. Second, like investors, managers are also optimistic about the prospect of the 
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companies, therefore they issue equity to finance "positive" present value projects 
which eventually incur losses. Loughran and Ritter (1997) assert that managers are 
too optimistic about the future earning power of SEOs. Nonetheless, the findings 
from Karpoff and Lee (1991) and Gombola, Lee and Liu (1997) suggest that the 
former is a more likely possibility. 
Unlike in prior studies, positive announcement period returns are found. It 
reveals that investors are over confident of the prospects of SEO firms. As implied 
by Healy and Palepu (1990) and Brous (1992), over-optimistic analysts' forecasts are 
accountable for investors' overestimation about values of SEOs. Therefore, investors 
are surprised at poor earnings realizations after SEOs. They re-evaluate the firm after 
a longer period and hence the long-run underperformance occurs as founded. Both 
the positive announcement returns and the long-run underperformance suggest that 
the market fails to completely adjust for the signaling information contained in the 
announcement of SEOs. 
In short, this thesis has shown that post-SEO profitability deterioration is also a 
common phenomenon in Hong Kong, but the decline is smaller for larger issuers, 
larger market transaction issuers and lower dividend payout ratio issuers. Degree of 
ownership concentration and family ownership do not significantly affect the 
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post-issue deterioration. At the same time, positive announcement effect and 
long-run underperformance in price of SEOs are found. Those findings support that 
the Free Cash Flow Theory, the Windows of Opportunity Theory, the Market 
Over-optimism Theory and the Earning Management Theory are explanations for the 
post-issue decline in firm values. Also, market investors do not anticipate the decline, 
fail to interpret the SEOs as negative signals of firm values and fail to revalue the 
SEOs. A simple strategy to investors: buy stocks of SEOs immediately after SEO 
announcements and sell them before one year after the announcement. Smaller SEOs, 
lower turnover SEOs and lower payout ratio SEOs are more preferable. 
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Figure 1. The operating performance of seasoned equity offering firms 
Note: 
This figure reports the median accounting ratios for the 925 seasoned equity offering (SEO) issuers in 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange from 1991 to 1999. Definitions of variables are given in the appendix. 
One year before the offering is denoted as Y-1 while t year(s) after the offering is denoted as Yt, 
where t =0, +1, +2, +3. All data is obtained from the DataStream, the PACAP and the Hong Kong 
Listed Companies Annual & Interim Reports. 
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Figure 2. The operating performance of seasoned equity offering firms split by the median of 
average total assets from Year -3 to Year -1 
Note: 
This figure reports the median accounting ratios for the 925 seasoned equity offering (SEO) issuers in 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange from 1991 to 1999. Definitions of variables are given in the appendix. 
One year before the offering is denoted as Y-1 while t year(s) after the offering is denoted as Yt, 
where t =0, +1, +2, +3. All data is obtained from the DataStream, the PACAP and the Hong Kong 
Listed Companies Annual & Interim Reports. The median average total assets is HK$609.112 million. 
If the average total assets data is not available in the data sources, the observation is dropped from the 
sample. In this section, 22 observations are excluded. 
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Figure 3. The operating performance of seasoned equity offering firms split by the median of 
turnover volume in Year 0 
Note: 
This figure reports the median accounting ratios for the 925 seasoned equity offering (SEO) issuers in 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange from 1991 to 1999. Definitions of variables are given in the appendix. 
One year before the offering is denoted as Y-1 while t year(s) after the offering is denoted as Yt, 
where t =0，+1, +2，+3. All data is obtained from the DataStream, the PACAP and the Hong Kong 
Listed Companies Annual & Interim Reports. The median turnover volume is 183.129 million shares. 
If the turnover by volume data is not available in the data sources, the observation is dropped from the 
sample. In this section, 18 observations are excluded. 
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Figure 4. The operating performance of seasoned equity offering firms split by the median of 
dividend payout ratio in Year 0 
Note: 
This figure reports the median accounting ratios for the 925 seasoned equity offering (SEO) issuers in 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange from 1991 to 1999. Definitions of variables are given in the appendix. 
One year before the offering is denoted as Y-1 while t year(s) after the offering is denoted as Yt, 
where t =0, +1，+2, +3. All data is obtained from the DataStream, the PACAP and the Hong Kong 
Listed Companies Annual & Interim Reports. The median dividend payout ratio is 11.29 percent. If 
the dividend payout ratio data is not available in the data source, the observation is dropped from the 
sample. In this section, 61 observations are excluded. 
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Figure 5. The operating performance of seasoned equity offering firms split by the median of 
percentage owned by the five largest owners at the end of 1996 
Note: 
This figure reports the median accounting ratios for the 925 seasoned equity offering (SEO) issuers in 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange from 1991 to 1999. Definitions of variables are given in the appendix. 
One year before the offering is denoted as Y-1 while t year(s) after the offering is denoted as Yt, 
where t =0, +1，+2, +3. All data is obtained from the DataStream, the PACAP, the Hong Kong Listed 
Companies Annual & Interim Reports, and Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000). The median 
percentage owned by the five largest owners is 35 percent. If the ownership structure data is not 
available in Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000), the observation is dropped. In this section, 406 
observations are excluded. 
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Figure 6. The operating performance of seasoned equity offering firms split by the identity of 
the largest shareholder at the end of 1996 
Note: 
This figure reports the median accounting ratios for the 925 seasoned equity offering (SEO) issuers in 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange from 1991 to 1999. Definitions of variables are given in the appendix. 
One year before the offering is denoted as Y-1 while t year(s) after the offering is denoted as Yt, 
where t =0, +1, +2, +3. All data is obtained from the DataStream, the PACAP, the Hong Kong Listed 
Companies Annual & Interim Reports, and Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000). If the ownership 
structure data is not available in Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000), the observation is dropped. In 
this section, 406 observations are excluded. 
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Figure 7. The stock price performance of seasoned equity offering firms split into large firms 
and small firms groups 
This figure reports the stock price performance for the 1165 seasoned equity offering (SEO) issuers in 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange from 1991 to 1999. The classification is the same as in Section 4.2.1. 
Buy-and-hold aftermarket returns over 1- to 5-day, 1-, 2- and 3-year windows relative to the day prior 
to the announcement date of the SEO are computed (it is denoted as D-1; Dt is t day(s) after the 
announcement where t = 0，+1, +2, +3, +4, +5; Yt is t year(s) after the announcement date where t = 
+1，+2, +3). The returns are calculated relative to D-1 and are simply the percentage changes of 
closing price within the time windows. The announcement dates are obtained from either the Hong 
Kong Economic Journal Monthly or the Stock Exchange Fact Book while the stock prices are 
collected from the DataStream. 
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Figure 8. The stock price performance of seasoned equity offering firms split into high-turnover 
firms and low-turnover firms groups 
This figure reports the stock price performance for the 1165 seasoned equity offering (SEO) issuers in 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange from 1991 to 1999. The classification is the same as in Section 4.2.2. 
Buy-and-hold aftermarket returns over 1-to 5-day, 1-, 2- and 3-year windows relative to the day prior 
to the announcement date of the SEO are computed (it is denoted as D-1; Dt is t day(s) after the 
announcement where t = 0，+1, +2, +3, +4, +5; Yt is t year(s) after the announcement date where t = 
+1, +2，+3). The returns are calculated relative to D-1 and are simply the percentage changes of 
closing price within the time windows. The announcement dates are obtained from either the Hong 
Kong Economic Journal Monthly or the Stock Exchange Fact Book while the stock prices are 
collected from the DataStream. 
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Figure 9. The stock price performance of seasoned equity offering firms split into high-payout 
firms and low-payout firms groups 
This figure reports the stock price performance for the 1165 seasoned equity offering (SEO) issuers in 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange from 1991 to 1999. The classification is the same as in Section 4.2.3. 
Buy-and-hold aftermarket returns over 1- to 5-day, 1-，2- and 3-year windows relative to the day prior 
to the announcement date of the SEO are computed (it is denoted as D-1; Dt is t day(s) after the 
announcement where t = 0, +1, +2, +3, +4，+5; Yt is t year(s) after the announcement date where t = 
+1, +2，+3). The returns are calculated relative to D-1 and are simply the percentage changes of 
closing price within the time windows. The announcement dates are obtained from either the Hong 
Kong Economic Journal Monthly or the Stock Exchange Fact Book while the stock prices are 
collected from the DataStream. 
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TABLE 1 
Number of Seasoned Equity Offerings by Year and Industry 
Panel A: Number of SEOs in Years 
Year Number of SEOs Percentage of Sample (%) 
1991 50 5.41 
1992 95 10.27 
1993 119 12.86 
1994 55 5.95 
1995 51 5.51 
1996 113 12.22 
1997 188 20.32 
1998 94 10.16 
1999 160 17.30 
Total m iQQ-QQ 
Panel B: Number of SEOs in Industries 
Industry INDC 3 Code Number of Offerings Percentage (%) 
Information technology 90 49 5.30 
Financials including property 80 206 22.27 
Utilities 70 7 0.76 
Non-cyclical services 60 17 1-84 
Cyclical services 50 138 14.92 
Non-cyclical consumer goods 40 39 4.22 
Cyclical consumer goods 30 144 15.57 
Basic industries 10 124 13.41 
Resources 0 1.41 
Others 20 188 20.32 
Total ^ 纖 
Note: 
The sample consists of the 925 seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) from 1991 to 1999. The sample 
satisfies the following conditions: 1) The SEOs are either placings, right issues or open offers. 2) 
Re-issues by the same firm in a year are counted as one issue. 3) SEOs with allotment date (for 
placings) or payment date (for rights issues) during the period 1991-1999. The industrial classification 




The Change in Operating Performance of Seasoned Equity Offering Firms 
Panel A: Change in the Net Profit Margin (%) 
Y-1 to Y+l Y-1 to Y+2 Y-1 to Y+3 YO to Y+l YO to Y+2 YO to Y+3 
Median (o/o) -3.773*** -6.380*** -6.602*** -1.468*** -4.161*** -4.250*** 
Number of observations 882 881 879 899 893 891 
Panel B: Change in the Pre-tax Return on Assets (%) 
Y-1 to Y+l Y-1 to Y+2 Y-1 to Y+3 YO to Y+l YO to Y+2 YO to Y+3 
Median (o/o) -2.965*** -4.712*** -4.498*** -1.241*** -2.138*** -2.208*** 
Number of observations 732 W i n m ^ 
Note: 
This table reports the median changes in levels of accounting ratios for the 925 seasoned equity 
offering (SEO) issuers in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange from 1991 to 1999. Definitions of variables 
are given in the appendix. One year before the offering is denoted as Y-1 while t year(s) after the 
offering is denoted as Yt, where t =0, +1, +2, +3. All data is obtained from the DataStream, the 
PACAP and the Hong Kong Listed Companies Annual & Interim Reports. The significance tests are 
based on the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent (Two-tailed) 
** Significant at the 5 percent (Two-tailed) 
* Significant at the 10 percent (Two-tailed) 
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TABLE 7 
The Change in Operating Performance of Seasoned Equity Offering Firms Split By the Median 
of Average Total Assets from Year -3 to Year - 1 
Panel A: Change in the Net Profit Margin (%) 
Y-1 to Y+1 Y-1 to Y+2 Y-1 to Y+3 YO to Y+1 YO to Y+2 YO to Y+3 
Large Firms 
Median -3.960*** -4.715*** -6.110*** -1.039*** -2.510*** -4.200*** 
Number of observations 441 440 441 444 440 441 
Small Firms 
Median -3.620*** -8.161*** -7.649*** -2.042*** -6.213*** -4.590*** 
Number of observations 437 437 434 442 440 437 
Wilcoxon Two-Sample ^21 -2 381** -0.785 -0.673 -2.369** -0.851 
Test Z-Statistic ‘ 
Panel B: Change in the Pre-tax Return on Assets (%) 
Y-1 to Y+1 Y-1 to Y+2 Y-1 to Y+3 YO to Y+1 YO to Y+2 YO to Y+3 
Large Firms 
Median -1.900*** -2.620*** -2.539*** -0.709*** -1.173*** -1.417*** 
Number of observations 389 392 390 409 407 405 
Small Firms 
Median -6.291*** -10.466*** -8.889*** -2.482*** -3.269*** -4.201*** 
Number of observations 343 345 342 389 388 385 
Wilcoxon Two-Sample _3 364*** -4 120*** -3.197*** -2.679*** -2.352** -1.700* 
Test Z-Statistic ‘ ‘ 
Note: 
This table reports the median changes in levels of accounting ratios for the 925 seasoned equity 
offering (SEO) issuers in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange from 1991 to 1999. Definitions of variables 
are given in the appendix. One year before the offering is denoted as Y-1 while t year(s) after the 
offering is denoted as Yt, where t =0, +1, +2, +3. All data is obtained from the DataStream, the 
PACAP and the Hong Kong Listed Companies Annual & Interim Reports. The median average total 
assets is HK$609.112 million. If the average total assets data is not available in the data sources, the 
observation is dropped from the sample. In this section, 22 observations are excluded. The 
significance tests are based on the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent (Two-tailed) 
** Significant at the 5 percent (Two-tailed) 
* Significant at the 10 percent (Two-tailed) 
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TABLE 7 
The Change in Operating Performance of Seasoned Equity Offering Firms Split By the Median of 
Turnover Volume in Year 0 
Panel A: Change in the Net Profit Margin (%) 
Y-1 to Y+1 Y-1 to Y+2 Y-1 to Y+3 YO to Y+1 YO to Y+2 YO to Y+3 
High-turnover Firms 
Median -4.136*** -5.163*** -5.287*** -2.077*** -2.76*** -3.113*** 
Number of observations 439 440 439 443 442 441 
Low-tumover Firms 
Median -3.309*** -7.118*** -8.131*** -1.208* -5.959*** -6.159*** 
Number of observations 434 433 432 445 441 440 
Wilcoxon Two-Sample Test _o 397 -2 327** -2.244** -2.044** -1.954* -1.912* 
Z-Statistic _ . • . 
Panel B: Change in the Pre-tax Return on Assets (%) 
Y-1 to Y+1 Y-1 to Y+2 Y-1 to Y+3 YO to Y+1 YO to Y+2 YO to Y+3 
High-turnover Firms 
Median -2.595*** -2.521*** -2.278*** -1.362*** -1.423*** -1.690*** 
Number of observations 372 377 375 400 401 399 
Low-tumover Firms 
Median -3.819*** -7.634*** -7.659*** -1.113** -2.906*** -3.546*** 
Number of observations 354 354 351 399 395 392 
Wilcoxon Two-Sample Test 159 .3 966*** -3.004*** -1.560 -1.825* -1.520 
Z-Statistic ‘ ^ 
Note: 
This table reports the median changes in levels of accounting ratios for the 925 seasoned equity offering 
(SEO) issuers in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange from 1991 to 1999. Definitions of variables are given 
in the appendix. One year before the offering is denoted as Y-1 while t year(s) after the offering is 
denoted as Yt, where t =0, +1，+2, +3. All data is obtained from the PACAP. The median turnover 
volume in Year 0 is 183.129 million shares. If the turnover volume data is not available in the data 
sources, the observation is dropped from the sample. In this section, 18 observations are excluded. The 
significance tests are based on the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent (Two-tailed) 
** Significant at the 5 percent (Two-tailed) 
* Significant at the 10 percent (Two-tailed) 
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TABLE 7 
The Change in Operating Performance of Seasoned Equity Offering Firms Split By the Median of 
Dividend Payout Ratio in Year 0 
Panel A: Change in the Net Profit Margin (%) 
Y-1 to Y+1 Y-1 to Y+2 Y-1 to Y+3 YO to Y+1 YO to Y+2 YO to Y+3 
High-pavout Firms 
Median -4.440*** -7.661*** -7.983*** -2.040*** -4.583*** -5.369*** 
Number of observations 414 415 414 423 420 419 
Low-pavout Firms 
Median -2.682*** -4.760*** -3.611*** -0.866*** -3.950*** -2.054*** 
Number of observations 416 413 412 426 423 422 
Wilcoxon Two-Sample ^^^ .0915 -l 887* -1.997** -1.217 -2.487*** 
Test Z-Statistic ‘ 
Panel B: Change in the Pre-tax Return on Assets (%) 
Y-1 to Y+1 Y-1 to Y+2 Y-1 to Y+3 YO to Y+1 YO to Y+2 YO to Y+3 
High-pavout Firms 
Median -3.669*** -6.064*** -6.286*** -1.447*** -2.693*** -3.458*** 
Number of observations 336 334 333 378 374 373 
Low-pavout Firms 
Median -1.692*** -2.873*** -0.891*** -0.428 -0.649* -0.079 
Number of observations 350 356 352 382 382 378 
Wilcoxon Two-Sample .3 jj^*** -3.983*** -4.719*** -2.909*** -3.813*** -4.711*** 
Test Z-Statistic ‘ ‘ ‘ 
Note: 
This table reports the median changes in levels of accounting ratios for the 925 seasoned equity offering 
(SEO) issuers in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange from 1991 to 1999. Definitions of variables are given 
in the appendix. One year before the offering is denoted as Y-1 while t year(s) after the offering is 
denoted as Yt, where t =0, +1, +2, +3. All data is obtained from the DataStream, the PACAP and the 
Hong Kong Listed Companies Annual & Interim Reports. The median dividend payout ratio is 11.29 
percent. If the dividend payout ratio data is not available in the data source, the observation is dropped 
from the sample. In this section, 61 observations are excluded. The significance tests are based on the 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent (Two-tailed) 
** Significant at the 5 percent (Two-tailed) 
* Significant at the 10 percent (Two-tailed) 
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TABLE 6 
The Change in Operating Performance of Seasoned Equity Offering Firms Split By the Median 
of Percentage Owned By the Five Largest Owners at the End of 1996 
Panel A: Change in the Net Profit Margin (%) 
Y-1 to Y+1 Y-1 to Y+2 Y-1 to Y+3 YO to Y+1 YO to Y+2 YO to Y+3 
High-ownership-
concentration Firms 
Median -3.594*** -5.735*** -6.003*** -1.810*** -3.555*** -4.705*** 
Number of observations 252 252 252 257 256 256 
Low-ownership-
concentration Firms 
Median -2.316*** -4.680*** -4.711*** -1.260** -3.090*** -3.600*** 
Number of observations 246 248 248 251 251 251 
Wilcoxon Two-Sample _o618 -0 592 -1.065 -0.088 -0.363 -1.101 
Test Z-Statistic ‘ 
Panel B: Change in the Pre-tax Return on Assets (%) 
Y-1 to Y+1 Y-1 to Y+2 Y-1 to Y+3 YO to Y+1 YO to Y+2 YO to Y+3 
High-ownership-
concentration Firms 
Median -3.788*** -5.534*** -5.304*** -1.391*** -2.341*** -3.885*** 
Number of observations 218 219 219 240 239 239 
Low-ownership-
concentration Firms 
Median -1.970*** -2.402*** -2.045*** -0.915*** -1.660*** -1.342*** 
Number of observations 201 202 203 225 225 226 
Wilcoxon Two-Sample ^gg .1.860* -1.936* -0.753 -0.707 -2.234** 
Test Z-Statistic 
Note: 
This figure reports the median changes in levels of accounting ratios for the 925 seasoned equity 
offering (SEO) issuers in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange from 1991 to 1999. Definitions of variables 
are given in the appendix. One year before the offering is denoted as Y-1 while t year(s) after the 
offering is denoted as Yt, where t =0, +1, +2, +3. All data is obtained from the DataStream, the 
PACAP, the Hong Kong Listed Companies Annual & Interim Reports, and Claessens, Djankov and 
Lang (2000). The median percentage owned by the five largest owners is 35 percent. If the ownership 
structure data is not available in Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000), the observation is dropped. In 
this section, 406 observations are excluded. The significance tests are based on the Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank Test. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent (Two-tailed) 
** Significant at the 5 percent (Two-tailed) 
* Significant at the 10 percent (Two-tailed) 
99 
TABLE 7 
The Change in Operating Performance of Seasoned Equity Offering Firms Split By the Identity 
of the Largest Shareholder at the End of 1996 
Panel A: Change in the Net Profit Margin (%) 
Y-1 to Y+1 Y-1 to Y+2 Y-1 to Y+3 YO to Y+1 YO to Y+2 YO to Y+3 
Family-owned Firms 
Median -2.605*** -4.990*** -4.930*** -1.367*** -3.244*** -3.948*** 
Number of observations 362 363 363 372 371 371 
Non-Familv-owned 
Firms 
Median -2.801*** -5.860*** -5.810*** -1.912*** -4.170*** -4.278*** 
Number of observations 136 137 137 136 136 136 
Wilcoxon Two-Sample ^^^ _o 787 -0.560 -0.622 -0.875 -0.514 
Test Z-Statistic ‘ 
Panel B: Change in the Pre-tax Return on Assets (%) 
Y-1 to Y+1 Y-1 to Y+2 Y-1 to Y+3 YO to Y+1 YO to Y+2 YO to Y+3 
Family-owned Firms 
Median -2.652*** -3.859*** -3.568*** -1.020*** -2.152*** -2.831*** 
Number of observations 300 302 303 337 336 337 
Non-Familv-owned 
Firms 
Median -2.685*** -3.360*** -2.045*** -1.054** -1.267*** -0.927** 
Number of observations 119 119 119 128 128 128 
Wilcoxon Two-Sample ^68 -0 815 -1.440 -0.555 -0.998 -1.706* 
Test Z-Statistic 
Note: 
This figure reports the median changes in levels of accounting ratios for the 925 seasoned equity 
offering (SEO) issuers in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange from 1991 to 1999. Definitions of variables 
are given in the appendix. One year before the offering is denoted as Y-1 while t year(s) after the 
offering is denoted as Yt, where t =0, +1’ +2，+3. All data is obtained from the DataStream, the 
PACAP, the Hong Kong Listed Companies Annual & Interim Reports, and Claessens, Djankov and 
Lang (2000). If the ownership structure data is not available in Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000)， 
the observation is dropped. In this section, 406 observations are excluded. The significance tests are 
based on the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent (Two-tailed) 
** Significant at the 5 percent (Two-tailed) 
* Significant at the 10 percent (Two-tailed) 
100 
TABLE 8 
The Stock Price Performance of Seasoned Equity Offering Firms 
Panel A: The Announcement Effect 
D-1 to DO D-1 to D+1 D-1 to D+2 D-1 to D+3 D-1 to D+4 D-1 to D+5 
Mean Percentage Change (%) 1.493*** 2.375*** 3.048*** 3.297*** 3.153*** 3.327*** 
Total Number of Observations = 1165 
Panel B: The Long-run Effect 
D-1 to Y+l D-1 to Y+2 D-1 to Y+3 
Mean Percentage Change (%) 1.710 -28.047*** -32.912*** 
Total Number of Observations = 1165 
Note: 
This table reports the stock price performance for the 1165 seasoned equity offering (SEO) issuers in the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange from 1991 to 1999. Buy-and-hold aftermarket returns over 1- to 5-day, 1-, 
2- and 3-year windows relative to the day prior to the announcement date of the SEO are computed (it is 
denoted as D-1; Dt is t day(s) after the announcement where t = 0，+1, +2, +3，+4, +5; Yt is t year(s) 
after the announcement date where t =+1 , +2, +3). The returns are calculated relative to D-1 and are 
simply the percentage changes of closing price within the time windows. The announcement dates are 
obtained from either the Hong Kong Economic Journal Monthly or the Stock Exchange Fact Book while 
the stock prices are collected from the DataStream. The significance tests are based on the t-test. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent (Two-tailed) 
** Significant at the 5 percent (Two-tailed) 
* Significant at the 10 percent (Two-tailed) 
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TABLE 9 
The Stock Price Performance of Seasoned Equity Offering Firms Split into Large Firms and 
Small Firms Groups 
Panel A: The Announcement Effect 
D-1 to DO D-1 to D+1 D-1 to D+2 D-1 to D+3 D-1 to D+4 D-1 to D+5 
Large Firms 
Mean Percentage Change (%) 1.572*** 1.573** 1.909** 1.747** 1.442* 1.771* 
Total Number of Observations = 494 
Small Firms 
Mean Percentage Change (%) 1.558*** 3.162*** 4.164*** 4.690*** 4.799*** 4.809*** 
Total Number of Observations = 545 
t-test Statistics -0.018 1.673* 1.804* 2.207** 2.286** 1.973** 
Panel B: The Long-run Effect 
D-1 to Y+1 D-1 to Y+2 D-1 to Y+3 
Large Firms 
Mean Percentage Change (%) -8.027** -28.718*** -31.212*** 
Total Number of Observations = 494 
Small Firms 
Mean Percentage Change (%) 15.380* -26.522*** -33.506*** 
Total Number of Observations = 545 
t-test Statistics 2.558* 0.432 -0.458 
Note: 
This table reports the stock price performance for the 1165 seasoned equity offering (SEO) issuers in the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange from 1991 to 1999. The classification is the same as in Section 4.2.1. 
Buy-and-hold aftermarket returns over 1- to 5-day, 1-，2- and 3-year windows relative to the day prior to 
the announcement date of the SEO are computed (it is denoted as D-1; Dt is t day(s) after the 
announcement where t = 0, +1, +2, +3, +4, +5; Yt is t year(s) after the announcement date where t = +1， 
+2, +3). The returns are calculated relative to D-1 and are simply the percentage changes of closing 
price within the time windows. The announcement dates are obtained from either the Hong Kong 
Economic Journal Monthly or the Stock Exchange Fact Book while the stock prices are collected from 
the DataStream. The significance tests are based on the t-test. In comparison between two means, 
variances are not assumed to be equal. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent (Two-tailed) 
** Significant at the 5 percent (Two-tailed) 
* Significant at the 10 percent (Two-tailed) 
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TABLE 10 
The Stock Price Performance of Seasoned Equity Offering Firms Split into High-turnover Firms 
and Low-turnover Firms Groups 
Panel A: The Announcement Effect 
D-1 to DO D-1 to D+1 D-1 to D+2 D-1 to D+3 D-1 to D+4 D-1 to D+5 
High-turnover Firms 
Mean Percentage Change (%) 1.006** 1.526*** 1.977** 1.867** 1.675 2.059* 
Total Number of Observations = 520 
Low-turnover Firms 
Mean Percentage Change (%) 2.138*** 3.240*** 4.139*** 4.580*** 4.580*** 4.544*** 
Total Number of Observations = 534 
t-test Statistics 1.542 1.829* 1.733* 2.038** 1.971** 1.608 
Panel B: The Long-run Effect 
D-1 to Y+l D-1 to Y+2 D-1 to Y+3 
High-tumover Firms 
Mean Percentage Change (%) -7.820 -26.488*** -24.194*** 
Total Number of Observations = 520 
Low-tumover Firms 
Mean Percentage Change (%) 15.68** -28.306*** -40.430*** 
Total Number of Observations = 534 
t-test Statistics 2.532** -0.363 -3.308*** 
Note: 
This table reports the stock price performance for the 1165 seasoned equity offering (SEO) issuers in the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange from 1991 to 1999. The classification is the same as in Section 4.2.2. 
Buy-and-hold aftermarket returns over 1- to 5-day, 1-, 2- and 3-year windows relative to the day prior to 
the announcement date of the SEO are computed (it is denoted as D-1; Dt is t day(s) after the 
announcement where t = 0, +1，+2, +3, +4，+5; Yt is t year(s) after the announcement date where t = +1, 
+2，+3). The returns are calculated relative to D-1 and are simply the percentage changes of closing price 
within the time windows. The announcement dates are obtained from either the Hong Kong Economic 
Journal Monthly or the Stock Exchange Fact Book while the stock prices are collected from the 
DataStream. The significance tests are based on the t-test. In comparison between two means, variances 
are not assumed to be equal. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent (Two-tailed) 
** Significant at the 5 percent (Two-tailed) 
* Significant at the 10 percent (Two-tailed) 
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TABLE 11 
The Stock Price Performance of Seasoned Equity Offering Firms Split into High-payout Firms 
and Low-payout Firms Groups 
Panel A: The Announcement Effect 
D-1 to DO D-1 to D+1 D-1 to D+2 D-1 to D+3 D-1 to D+4 D-1 to D+5 
High-pavout Firms 
Mean Percentage Change (%) 0.749* 0.959 1.793* 1.976* 2.118* 1.924 
Total Number of Observations = 439 
Low -payout Firms 
Mean Percentage Change (%) 2.487*** 3.868*** 4.456*** 4.701*** 4.600*** 5.034*** 
Total Number of Observations = 549 
t-test Statistics 2.327** 3.060*** 2.008** 1.926* 1.567 1.912* 
Panel B: The Long-run Effect 
D-1 to Y+1 D-1 to Y+2 D-1 to Y+3 
High-pavout Firms 
Mean Percentage Change (%) -7.405** -22.649*** -18.629*** 
Total Number of Observations = 439 
Low -payout Firms 
Mean Percentage Change (%) 14.689* -34.391*** -43.847*** 
Total Number of Observations = 549 
t-test Statistics 2.414** -2 .468" -4.905*** 
Note: 
This table reports the stock price performance for the 1165 seasoned equity offering (SEO) issuers in the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange from 1991 to 1999. The classification is the same as in Section 4.2.3. 
Buy-and-hold aftermarket returns over 1-to 5-day, 1-, 2- and 3-year windows relative to the day prior to 
the announcement date of the SEO are computed (it is denoted as D-1; Dt is t day(s) after the 
announcement where t = 0, +1, +2，+3, +4, +5; Yt is t year(s) after the announcement date where t = +1, 
+2, +3). The returns are calculated relative to D-1 and are simply the percentage changes of closing 
price within the time windows. The announcement dates are obtained from either the Hong Kong 
Economic Journal Monthly or the Stock Exchange Fact Book while the stock prices are collected from 
the DataStream. The significance tests are based on the t-test. In comparison between two means, 
variances are not assumed to be equal. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent (Two-tailed) 
** Significant at the 5 percent (Two-tailed) 
* Significant at the 10 percent (Two-tailed) 
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APPENDIX 
Definitions of Variables 
Variables Definitions 
Cash dividends per share The total dividends actually paid to common stockholders in the form of 
cash during the year 
Dividend payout ratio The cash dividends per share multiplied by the number of shares 
outstanding and divided by the net income 
Net income The published net profit 
Net profit margin The published after-tax profit divided by the total sales or total property 
income depending on sectors at the end of year 
Number of shares The number of shares of common stock outstanding at the end of year 
outstanding 
Pre-tax return The profit before tax published by the company and inclusive of 
associates pre-tax profit 
Pre-tax return on assets The pre-tax profit divided by the total assets at the end of year 
The percentage owned by The voting rights share of the five largest owners in percentage of total 
the five largest owners outstanding shares 
Total assets The sum of tangible and intangible fixed assets, other long-term assets 
and investments, and current assets reported in balance sheet 
Turnover volume The number of shares traded for a stock in a year 
Source: 
The DataStream, the PACAP, and Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) 
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